Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain considering Different Fairness Preferences and Low-Carbon Advertising Level
Countries around the world advocate low-carbon, green, and environmentally friendly lifestyles to combat climate change, which provides clear direction for enterprise decisions. This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain based on behavioral economics, incentive theory, and optimizatio...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2022-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4589681 |
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| Summary: | Countries around the world advocate low-carbon, green, and environmentally friendly lifestyles to combat climate change, which provides clear direction for enterprise decisions. This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain based on behavioral economics, incentive theory, and optimization models to better formulate pricing decisions. This paper constructs a fair and neutral decentralized decision-making model (FNDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering Nash bargaining fairness concerns (NBFDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering absolute fairness concerns (AFDD), and a fair and neutral centralized decision-making model (FNCD) considering consumer preferences and the situations where supply chain members are fairness concerns or fairness neutrality. This paper analyzes the effect of low-carbon advertising level on pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores and compares pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores in four decisions. The results show that Nash bargaining fairness concerns of supply chain members could effectively reduce the retail price of low-carbon products and increase their sales volumes. Absolute fairness concerns intensify the dual marginal effect of decentralized decision-making. |
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| ISSN: | 1607-887X |