Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies
Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evoluti...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
|
| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6693597 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832555230602985472 |
|---|---|
| author | Zhiqi Xu Yukun Cheng Shuangliang Yao |
| author_facet | Zhiqi Xu Yukun Cheng Shuangliang Yao |
| author_sort | Zhiqi Xu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ea397af924744e228dc58ec979498f8f |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-ea397af924744e228dc58ec979498f8f2025-02-03T05:49:18ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/66935976693597Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health EmergenciesZhiqi Xu0Yukun Cheng1Shuangliang Yao2School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, ChinaSchool of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215009, ChinaJiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212008, ChinaPublic health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6693597 |
| spellingShingle | Zhiqi Xu Yukun Cheng Shuangliang Yao Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies |
| title_full | Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies |
| title_fullStr | Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies |
| title_short | Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies |
| title_sort | tripartite evolutionary game model for public health emergencies |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6693597 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zhiqixu tripartiteevolutionarygamemodelforpublichealthemergencies AT yukuncheng tripartiteevolutionarygamemodelforpublichealthemergencies AT shuangliangyao tripartiteevolutionarygamemodelforpublichealthemergencies |