Illusion in Du Châtelet's Theory of Happiness
In her Discourse on Happiness, Émilie Du Châtelet claims that one must be susceptible to illusions to be happy. She gives almost no explanation of what illusions are or what causes them, and thus does not appear to satisfactorily defend her claim. I offer an account of Du Châtelet’s theory of illusi...
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| Format: | Article |
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Aperio
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/pubid/236/ |
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| Summary: | In her Discourse on Happiness, Émilie Du Châtelet claims that one must be susceptible to illusions to be happy. She gives almost no explanation of what illusions are or what causes them, and thus does not appear to satisfactorily defend her claim. I offer an account of Du Châtelet’s theory of illusion by drawing upon the previously unexamined influence of other French philosophers’ accounts of the connection between passion and illusions, including Descartes, Malebranche, and Anne-Thérèse, Marquise de Lambert. According to this tradition, the passions misrepresentations of their objects in the imagination, which are called “illusions”. This theory of passionate misrepresentation to Du Châtelet promises to solve a number of puzzles about illusion that arise in the Discourse. First, it explains why she claims illusions are necessary for happiness. Second, it offers an explanation of how illusions are different from cognitive errors made in other domains, like philosophy and natural science. |
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| ISSN: | 2644-0652 |