Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective
Abstract The perceived benefits of prefabrication may be offset by its low acceptance and uptake. This is exacerbated by uncertainties faced by manufacturers in which short lead-times result in both high crashing costs combined with demand opportunity loss to time-sensitive consumers. This study int...
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Springer Nature
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04534-3 |
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| author | Wen Jiang Ting Huang Kanfeng Shi Igor Martek |
| author_facet | Wen Jiang Ting Huang Kanfeng Shi Igor Martek |
| author_sort | Wen Jiang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract The perceived benefits of prefabrication may be offset by its low acceptance and uptake. This is exacerbated by uncertainties faced by manufacturers in which short lead-times result in both high crashing costs combined with demand opportunity loss to time-sensitive consumers. This study introduces a lead-time incentive mechanism into the prefabricated construction supply chain. The aim is to develop strategies that give supply chain stakeholders greater lead-time stability and higher profit, thereby attract more entrants. This paper explores a hypothetical two-echelon prefabricated construction supply chain consisting of an assembler and a manufacturer, employing Stackelberg and Nash game models. Findings confirm that lead-time incentives do indeed improve the profits of prefabricated construction manufacturers. However, the profits gained by prefabrication assemblers as well as the supply chain overall is contingent on consumer price sensitivity, where lower consumer price sensitivity is more conducive to profit optimization. Further, supply chain profit can be optimized under conditions of a global optimal model of complete cooperation. We show that the dynamic wholesale price contract and cost and revenue sharing contract effectively optimize enterprise decisions under variable circumstances. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-d2bcd21eb2bb48d4a2a8cc8c0a346b7c |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2662-9992 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-03-01 |
| publisher | Springer Nature |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| spelling | doaj-art-d2bcd21eb2bb48d4a2a8cc8c0a346b7c2025-08-20T02:10:20ZengSpringer NatureHumanities & Social Sciences Communications2662-99922025-03-0112111510.1057/s41599-025-04534-3Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspectiveWen Jiang0Ting Huang1Kanfeng Shi2Igor Martek3College of Architecture and Urban–Rural Planning, Sichuan Agricultural UniversityCollege of Architecture and Urban–Rural Planning, Sichuan Agricultural UniversityCollege of Architecture and Urban–Rural Planning, Sichuan Agricultural UniversitySchool of Architecture and Built Environment, Deakin UniversityAbstract The perceived benefits of prefabrication may be offset by its low acceptance and uptake. This is exacerbated by uncertainties faced by manufacturers in which short lead-times result in both high crashing costs combined with demand opportunity loss to time-sensitive consumers. This study introduces a lead-time incentive mechanism into the prefabricated construction supply chain. The aim is to develop strategies that give supply chain stakeholders greater lead-time stability and higher profit, thereby attract more entrants. This paper explores a hypothetical two-echelon prefabricated construction supply chain consisting of an assembler and a manufacturer, employing Stackelberg and Nash game models. Findings confirm that lead-time incentives do indeed improve the profits of prefabricated construction manufacturers. However, the profits gained by prefabrication assemblers as well as the supply chain overall is contingent on consumer price sensitivity, where lower consumer price sensitivity is more conducive to profit optimization. Further, supply chain profit can be optimized under conditions of a global optimal model of complete cooperation. We show that the dynamic wholesale price contract and cost and revenue sharing contract effectively optimize enterprise decisions under variable circumstances.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04534-3 |
| spellingShingle | Wen Jiang Ting Huang Kanfeng Shi Igor Martek Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| title | Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective |
| title_full | Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective |
| title_fullStr | Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective |
| title_short | Pricing, crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead-time incentive: a power perspective |
| title_sort | pricing crashing and coordination for prefabricated construction supply chain with the lead time incentive a power perspective |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04534-3 |
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