Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly
In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2013-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/320712 |
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| _version_ | 1832563736361041920 |
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| author | Aiyuan Tao Yingjun Zhu Xiangqing Zou |
| author_facet | Aiyuan Tao Yingjun Zhu Xiangqing Zou |
| author_sort | Aiyuan Tao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. It is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-d1cbda5e3380499897721b11fb0dcf6d |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1110-757X 1687-0042 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2013-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj-art-d1cbda5e3380499897721b11fb0dcf6d2025-02-03T01:12:42ZengWileyJournal of Applied Mathematics1110-757X1687-00422013-01-01201310.1155/2013/320712320712Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed DuopolyAiyuan Tao0Yingjun Zhu1Xiangqing Zou2School of Mathematics and Information Science, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, Shanghai 201620, ChinaAccounting Research Institute, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, ChinaSchool of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce, ChinaIn the standard leader-follower duopoly models with otherwise symmetric firms, the market outcome and total welfare are the same whichever firm is the leader. This paper studies and compares total welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the public firm or the private firm acts as the leader. It is found that the fact that which firm is the leader affects total welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market leader.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/320712 |
| spellingShingle | Aiyuan Tao Yingjun Zhu Xiangqing Zou Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly Journal of Applied Mathematics |
| title | Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly |
| title_full | Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly |
| title_fullStr | Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly |
| title_full_unstemmed | Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly |
| title_short | Welfare Comparison of Leader-Follower Models in a Mixed Duopoly |
| title_sort | welfare comparison of leader follower models in a mixed duopoly |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/320712 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT aiyuantao welfarecomparisonofleaderfollowermodelsinamixedduopoly AT yingjunzhu welfarecomparisonofleaderfollowermodelsinamixedduopoly AT xiangqingzou welfarecomparisonofleaderfollowermodelsinamixedduopoly |