Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit
To get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of Ito^'s stochastic di...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5596015 |
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| _version_ | 1832561591879467008 |
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| author | Qingfeng Zhu Kaimin Zheng Yilin Wei |
| author_facet | Qingfeng Zhu Kaimin Zheng Yilin Wei |
| author_sort | Qingfeng Zhu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | To get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of Ito^'s stochastic differential equation (SDE). Then, we discussed the impacts of incentive and penalty parameters on green credit. Through the above analysis, we got the following conclusions: (1) rewards and punishments always benefit green production and green credit, but increasing incentives is not conducive to the governments’ performance of regulatory duties; (2) punishments can better improve the convergence rate of players’ strategy than rewards; and (3) both rewards and punishments can exert an obvious effect in improving the changing degree of players’ strategy. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to optimize the green credit mechanism. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-c5a39484459f4c8e833aa68c8b709f43 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-c5a39484459f4c8e833aa68c8b709f432025-02-03T01:24:41ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55960155596015Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green CreditQingfeng Zhu0Kaimin Zheng1Yilin Wei2School of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, ChinaSchool of Mathematics and Quantitative Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, ChinaTo get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of Ito^'s stochastic differential equation (SDE). Then, we discussed the impacts of incentive and penalty parameters on green credit. Through the above analysis, we got the following conclusions: (1) rewards and punishments always benefit green production and green credit, but increasing incentives is not conducive to the governments’ performance of regulatory duties; (2) punishments can better improve the convergence rate of players’ strategy than rewards; and (3) both rewards and punishments can exert an obvious effect in improving the changing degree of players’ strategy. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to optimize the green credit mechanism.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5596015 |
| spellingShingle | Qingfeng Zhu Kaimin Zheng Yilin Wei Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit |
| title_full | Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit |
| title_fullStr | Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit |
| title_full_unstemmed | Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit |
| title_short | Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Green Credit |
| title_sort | three party stochastic evolutionary game analysis of reward and punishment mechanism for green credit |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5596015 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT qingfengzhu threepartystochasticevolutionarygameanalysisofrewardandpunishmentmechanismforgreencredit AT kaiminzheng threepartystochasticevolutionarygameanalysisofrewardandpunishmentmechanismforgreencredit AT yilinwei threepartystochasticevolutionarygameanalysisofrewardandpunishmentmechanismforgreencredit |