Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front
Since February 2022, the entire architecture of international relations and the security situation have changed, primarily in the Eastern European and Scandinavian-Baltic directions, where multi-vector hybrid anti-Russian actions have unfolded, they have affected the very sensitive area of religion...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Russian |
| Published: |
Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences
2024-12-01
|
| Series: | Научно-аналитический вестник Института Европы РАН |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran620244958 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832591183520464896 |
|---|---|
| author | Roman N. Lunkin |
| author_facet | Roman N. Lunkin |
| author_sort | Roman N. Lunkin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Since February 2022, the entire architecture of international relations and the security situation have changed, primarily in the Eastern European and Scandinavian-Baltic directions, where multi-vector hybrid anti-Russian actions have unfolded, they have affected the very sensitive area of religion and freedom of conscience. The purpose of the article is to analyze the situation of Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, under pressure from the executive authorities of these states and their ideological and financial support for parallel structures of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The article examines the strategy of the Baltic states’ aggressively secularist policy towards Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltics, on the one hand, and the methods of self-preservation of Orthodox communities, on the other. The concept of the «Russian world» is subjected to particularly fierce criticism by opponents of Russian Orthodoxy, Patriarch Bartholomew and the Baltic political elites, which is seen as a justification for possible expansion, which is so frightening to the average European. It is noted that horizontal civil interaction, which has been forming for decades, interfaith cooperation and faith help the Orthodox to survive in the conditions of hybrid threats. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-a76d33abe278428dacb34f3ce0b5ddb6 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2618-7914 |
| language | Russian |
| publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
| publisher | Institute of Europe Russian Academy of Sciences |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Научно-аналитический вестник Института Европы РАН |
| spelling | doaj-art-a76d33abe278428dacb34f3ce0b5ddb62025-01-22T17:59:31ZrusInstitute of Europe Russian Academy of SciencesНаучно-аналитический вестник Института Европы РАН2618-79142024-12-014264958http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran620244958Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic frontRoman N. Lunkin0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4312-4228Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, RussiaSince February 2022, the entire architecture of international relations and the security situation have changed, primarily in the Eastern European and Scandinavian-Baltic directions, where multi-vector hybrid anti-Russian actions have unfolded, they have affected the very sensitive area of religion and freedom of conscience. The purpose of the article is to analyze the situation of Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, under pressure from the executive authorities of these states and their ideological and financial support for parallel structures of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The article examines the strategy of the Baltic states’ aggressively secularist policy towards Russian Orthodoxy in the Baltics, on the one hand, and the methods of self-preservation of Orthodox communities, on the other. The concept of the «Russian world» is subjected to particularly fierce criticism by opponents of Russian Orthodoxy, Patriarch Bartholomew and the Baltic political elites, which is seen as a justification for possible expansion, which is so frightening to the average European. It is noted that horizontal civil interaction, which has been forming for decades, interfaith cooperation and faith help the Orthodox to survive in the conditions of hybrid threats. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran620244958baltic-scandinavian macroregionlithuanialatviaestoniareligionorthodoxyfreedom of consciencesecurity |
| spellingShingle | Roman N. Lunkin Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front Научно-аналитический вестник Института Европы РАН baltic-scandinavian macroregion lithuania latvia estonia religion orthodoxy freedom of conscience security |
| title | Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front |
| title_full | Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front |
| title_fullStr | Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front |
| title_short | Hybrid «war» with orthodoxy: features of the Baltic front |
| title_sort | hybrid war with orthodoxy features of the baltic front |
| topic | baltic-scandinavian macroregion lithuania latvia estonia religion orthodoxy freedom of conscience security |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran620244958 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT romannlunkin hybridwarwithorthodoxyfeaturesofthebalticfront |