The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy
There is a close link between the number of suppliers and the quality of products including service. However, there is a research gap in this field. Particularly, the problem whether this link would be affected by different supply chain profit distribution policies is lack of in-depth research. In t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2014-01-01
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| Series: | Abstract and Applied Analysis |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/956569 |
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| author | Weihua Liu Yijia Wang Zhicheng Liang Xiaoyan Liu |
| author_facet | Weihua Liu Yijia Wang Zhicheng Liang Xiaoyan Liu |
| author_sort | Weihua Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | There is a close link between the number of suppliers and the quality of products including service. However, there is a research gap in this field. Particularly, the problem whether this link would be affected by different supply chain profit distribution policies is lack of in-depth research. In this paper, a basic game model for quality supervision game without FLSPs’ competition (Model I) in a logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is established first. Model I adopts a mixed payment contract and is composed of a logistics service integrator (LSI) and functional logistics service provider (FLSP). The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of Model I is presented. Model II considering competition among FLSPs is then built based on Model I, and the new mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is provided. Results show that under competition the ordinary mixed payment contract cannot make quality supervision game parameters all optimized. Therefore, Model III under a compensation mechanism is established based on Model II, and the range of the compensation value is calculated. Furthermore, we propose three kinds of concrete compensation mechanisms, which are fixed, linear, and nonlinear compensation mechanism. And the optimal compensation mechanism for a LSI with different numbers of FLSPs is provided. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9c807821884d47758de9da78ded89ab4 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1085-3375 1687-0409 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2014-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Abstract and Applied Analysis |
| spelling | doaj-art-9c807821884d47758de9da78ded89ab42025-02-03T01:03:21ZengWileyAbstract and Applied Analysis1085-33751687-04092014-01-01201410.1155/2014/956569956569The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation StrategyWeihua Liu0Yijia Wang1Zhicheng Liang2Xiaoyan Liu3School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaSchool of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaSchool of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaSchool of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaThere is a close link between the number of suppliers and the quality of products including service. However, there is a research gap in this field. Particularly, the problem whether this link would be affected by different supply chain profit distribution policies is lack of in-depth research. In this paper, a basic game model for quality supervision game without FLSPs’ competition (Model I) in a logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is established first. Model I adopts a mixed payment contract and is composed of a logistics service integrator (LSI) and functional logistics service provider (FLSP). The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of Model I is presented. Model II considering competition among FLSPs is then built based on Model I, and the new mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is provided. Results show that under competition the ordinary mixed payment contract cannot make quality supervision game parameters all optimized. Therefore, Model III under a compensation mechanism is established based on Model II, and the range of the compensation value is calculated. Furthermore, we propose three kinds of concrete compensation mechanisms, which are fixed, linear, and nonlinear compensation mechanism. And the optimal compensation mechanism for a LSI with different numbers of FLSPs is provided.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/956569 |
| spellingShingle | Weihua Liu Yijia Wang Zhicheng Liang Xiaoyan Liu The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy Abstract and Applied Analysis |
| title | The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy |
| title_full | The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy |
| title_fullStr | The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy |
| title_short | The Influence Analysis of Number of Functional Logistics Service Providers on Quality Supervision Game in LSSC with Compensation Strategy |
| title_sort | influence analysis of number of functional logistics service providers on quality supervision game in lssc with compensation strategy |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/956569 |
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