Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games
Summary: In recent years, incorporating tax mechanisms into evolutionary game theory has become a popular research focus. However, previous studies often failed to simultaneously consider the coexistence of heterogeneity in tax collection and distribution. In this article, we introduce a heterogeneo...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2025-02-01
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| Series: | iScience |
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| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004225000732 |
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| author | Li Yue Huizhen Zhang Yueyu Sun Tianbo An Jingrui Wang |
| author_facet | Li Yue Huizhen Zhang Yueyu Sun Tianbo An Jingrui Wang |
| author_sort | Li Yue |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Summary: In recent years, incorporating tax mechanisms into evolutionary game theory has become a popular research focus. However, previous studies often failed to simultaneously consider the coexistence of heterogeneity in tax collection and distribution. In this article, we introduce a heterogeneous tax mechanism and apply it to the reward model of the traditional public goods game. Surprisingly, changes in reward costs have little impact on defectors, primarily influencing competition within cooperative strategies. We explain the reason for this phenomenon through the individual’s strategy transfer probabilities. Another important finding is that rewarding cooperators is always available despite their number being few at lower tax rates. It is because when rewarding cooperators face unfavorable situations, global tax becomes a key factor in maintaining their survival. Finally, the robustness of the model is verified. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9c5431e1526143ad9518a92e2f82dcdd |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2589-0042 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-02-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | iScience |
| spelling | doaj-art-9c5431e1526143ad9518a92e2f82dcdd2025-01-29T05:01:38ZengElsevieriScience2589-00422025-02-01282111813Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods gamesLi Yue0Huizhen Zhang1Yueyu Sun2Tianbo An3Jingrui Wang4School of Computer Science and Technology, Changchun University, Changchun 130022, ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Technology, Changchun University, Changchun 130022, China; Key Laboratory of Intelligent Rehabilitation and Barrier-free for the Disabled (Ministry of Education), Changchun University, Changchun 130000, China; Jilin Provincial Key Laboratory of Human Health Status Identification&Function Enhancement, Changchun 130000, China; Jilin Province the Manchuria Railway Key Laboratory of Data Engineering and Intelligent Decision Making, Changchun 130000, ChinaSchool of Information Science And Engineering, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, ChinaSchool of Computer Science and Technology, Changchun University, Changchun 130022, China; Key Laboratory of Intelligent Rehabilitation and Barrier-free for the Disabled (Ministry of Education), Changchun University, Changchun 130000, China; Jilin Provincial Key Laboratory of Human Health Status Identification&Function Enhancement, Changchun 130000, China; Jilin Province the Manchuria Railway Key Laboratory of Data Engineering and Intelligent Decision Making, Changchun 130000, China; Corresponding authorSchool of Cyberspace, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310018, ChinaSummary: In recent years, incorporating tax mechanisms into evolutionary game theory has become a popular research focus. However, previous studies often failed to simultaneously consider the coexistence of heterogeneity in tax collection and distribution. In this article, we introduce a heterogeneous tax mechanism and apply it to the reward model of the traditional public goods game. Surprisingly, changes in reward costs have little impact on defectors, primarily influencing competition within cooperative strategies. We explain the reason for this phenomenon through the individual’s strategy transfer probabilities. Another important finding is that rewarding cooperators is always available despite their number being few at lower tax rates. It is because when rewarding cooperators face unfavorable situations, global tax becomes a key factor in maintaining their survival. Finally, the robustness of the model is verified.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004225000732Computer scienceSocial sciences |
| spellingShingle | Li Yue Huizhen Zhang Yueyu Sun Tianbo An Jingrui Wang Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games iScience Computer science Social sciences |
| title | Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| title_full | Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| title_fullStr | Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| title_short | Cooperative evolution with reward-based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| title_sort | cooperative evolution with reward based heterogeneous tax in spatial public goods games |
| topic | Computer science Social sciences |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589004225000732 |
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