Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline

In this paper, we study a model of continuous-time insider trading in which noise traders have some memories and the trading stops at a random deadline. By a filtering theory on fractional Brownian motion and the stochastic maximum principle, we obtain a necessary condition of the insider’s optimal...

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Main Authors: Kai Xiao, Yonghui Zhou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Journal of Mathematics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/2973361
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author Kai Xiao
Yonghui Zhou
author_facet Kai Xiao
Yonghui Zhou
author_sort Kai Xiao
collection DOAJ
description In this paper, we study a model of continuous-time insider trading in which noise traders have some memories and the trading stops at a random deadline. By a filtering theory on fractional Brownian motion and the stochastic maximum principle, we obtain a necessary condition of the insider’s optimal strategy, an equation satisfied. It shows that when the volatility of noise traders is constant and the noise traders’ memories become weaker and weaker, the optimal trading intensity and the corresponding residual information tend to those, respectively, when noise traders have no any memory. And, numerical simulation illustrates that if both the trading intensity of the insider and the volatility of noise trades are independent of trading time, the insider’s expected profit is always lower than that when the asset value is disclosed at a finite fixed time; this is because the trading time ahead is a random deadline which yields the loss of the insider’s information.
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institution Kabale University
issn 2314-4629
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language English
publishDate 2021-01-01
publisher Wiley
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series Journal of Mathematics
spelling doaj-art-8736c006f7ee4d0ebd56f906dbdec5ab2025-02-03T01:27:22ZengWileyJournal of Mathematics2314-46292314-47852021-01-01202110.1155/2021/29733612973361Insider Trading with Memory under Random DeadlineKai Xiao0Yonghui Zhou1School of Mathematics, Guizhou Normal University, Guiyang 550001, ChinaSchool of Big Data and Computer Science, Guizhou Normal University, Guiyang 550001, ChinaIn this paper, we study a model of continuous-time insider trading in which noise traders have some memories and the trading stops at a random deadline. By a filtering theory on fractional Brownian motion and the stochastic maximum principle, we obtain a necessary condition of the insider’s optimal strategy, an equation satisfied. It shows that when the volatility of noise traders is constant and the noise traders’ memories become weaker and weaker, the optimal trading intensity and the corresponding residual information tend to those, respectively, when noise traders have no any memory. And, numerical simulation illustrates that if both the trading intensity of the insider and the volatility of noise trades are independent of trading time, the insider’s expected profit is always lower than that when the asset value is disclosed at a finite fixed time; this is because the trading time ahead is a random deadline which yields the loss of the insider’s information.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/2973361
spellingShingle Kai Xiao
Yonghui Zhou
Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
Journal of Mathematics
title Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
title_full Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
title_fullStr Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
title_full_unstemmed Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
title_short Insider Trading with Memory under Random Deadline
title_sort insider trading with memory under random deadline
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/2973361
work_keys_str_mv AT kaixiao insidertradingwithmemoryunderrandomdeadline
AT yonghuizhou insidertradingwithmemoryunderrandomdeadline