Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason
In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinoza’s mereology. In the second half of the paper,...
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Main Author: | Róbert Mátyási |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Aperio
2020-03-01
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Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2103/ |
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