Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects
The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3123572 |
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| author | Jun Wang Xianxue Cheng Xinyu Wang Hongtao Yang Shuhua Zhang |
| author_facet | Jun Wang Xianxue Cheng Xinyu Wang Hongtao Yang Shuhua Zhang |
| author_sort | Jun Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7a51e7a72f8545f7bf469f9be907db88 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-7a51e7a72f8545f7bf469f9be907db882025-02-03T01:03:18ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262019-01-01201910.1155/2019/31235723123572Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission EffectsJun Wang0Xianxue Cheng1Xinyu Wang2Hongtao Yang3Shuhua Zhang4School of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, ChinaCoordinated Innovation Center for Computable Modeling in Management Science, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, ChinaDepartment of Mathematical Sciences, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154, USASchool of Management Science and Engineering, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, ChinaThe increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3123572 |
| spellingShingle | Jun Wang Xianxue Cheng Xinyu Wang Hongtao Yang Shuhua Zhang Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects Complexity |
| title | Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects |
| title_full | Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects |
| title_fullStr | Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects |
| title_full_unstemmed | Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects |
| title_short | Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects |
| title_sort | myopic versus farsighted behaviors in a low carbon supply chain with reference emission effects |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3123572 |
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