The Optimal Licensing Contract in a Differentiated Stackelberg Model
This paper extends the work of Wang (2002) by considering a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm is an inside innovator and licenses its new technology by three options, that is, fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, and two-part tariff licensing. The main contributions and concl...
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Main Authors: | Xianpei Hong, Lijun Yang, Huaige Zhang, Dan Zhao |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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Series: | The Scientific World Journal |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/437919 |
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