Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy

This study examines pricing strategies within a two-tier traceable agricultural product supply chain, encompassing both the retailer and the supplier. A pricing decision model was developed to evaluate scenarios characterized by the retailer's overconfidence as well as those devoid of such bias...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chongfeng Lan, Yaru Lan, Shengde Liu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2025-01-01
Series:Alexandria Engineering Journal
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016824014479
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1832583087066710016
author Chongfeng Lan
Yaru Lan
Shengde Liu
author_facet Chongfeng Lan
Yaru Lan
Shengde Liu
author_sort Chongfeng Lan
collection DOAJ
description This study examines pricing strategies within a two-tier traceable agricultural product supply chain, encompassing both the retailer and the supplier. A pricing decision model was developed to evaluate scenarios characterized by the retailer's overconfidence as well as those devoid of such bias. This research employs Stackelberg game theory to investigate the impact of government subsidies, retailer overconfidence and consumer preferences for traceability on the performance of supply chain participants and the overall system. Our analysis derives the following findings: (i) retailer overconfidence strengthens their commitment to traceability, thereby enhancing the overall efficacy of the supply chain. (ii) Additionally, consumer demand for traceability incentivizes retailers to intensify their traceability initiatives, aligning with consumer purchasing expectations. (iii) The pricing decisions made by retailers are influenced by their overconfidence, consumer preferences for traceability, and the presence of government subsidies. (vi) The study also shows that retailer overconfidence and customer demand for traceability have the most effects on supply chain performance when decision-making is centralized.
format Article
id doaj-art-51dbcfafc6b545168007c22d6b9a99e4
institution Kabale University
issn 1110-0168
language English
publishDate 2025-01-01
publisher Elsevier
record_format Article
series Alexandria Engineering Journal
spelling doaj-art-51dbcfafc6b545168007c22d6b9a99e42025-01-29T05:00:18ZengElsevierAlexandria Engineering Journal1110-01682025-01-01112487495Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidyChongfeng Lan0Yaru Lan1Shengde Liu2School of Economics, Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang 236037, ChinaSchool of Economics, Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang 236037, ChinaCorresponding author.; School of Economics, Fuyang Normal University, Fuyang 236037, ChinaThis study examines pricing strategies within a two-tier traceable agricultural product supply chain, encompassing both the retailer and the supplier. A pricing decision model was developed to evaluate scenarios characterized by the retailer's overconfidence as well as those devoid of such bias. This research employs Stackelberg game theory to investigate the impact of government subsidies, retailer overconfidence and consumer preferences for traceability on the performance of supply chain participants and the overall system. Our analysis derives the following findings: (i) retailer overconfidence strengthens their commitment to traceability, thereby enhancing the overall efficacy of the supply chain. (ii) Additionally, consumer demand for traceability incentivizes retailers to intensify their traceability initiatives, aligning with consumer purchasing expectations. (iii) The pricing decisions made by retailers are influenced by their overconfidence, consumer preferences for traceability, and the presence of government subsidies. (vi) The study also shows that retailer overconfidence and customer demand for traceability have the most effects on supply chain performance when decision-making is centralized.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016824014479Consumers' traceability preferencesGovernment subsidyOverconfidence preferencesTraceable agricultural supply chain
spellingShingle Chongfeng Lan
Yaru Lan
Shengde Liu
Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
Alexandria Engineering Journal
Consumers' traceability preferences
Government subsidy
Overconfidence preferences
Traceable agricultural supply chain
title Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
title_full Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
title_fullStr Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
title_full_unstemmed Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
title_short Pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer's overconfidence with government subsidy
title_sort pricing strategy of traceable agricultural supply chain decisions considering retailer s overconfidence with government subsidy
topic Consumers' traceability preferences
Government subsidy
Overconfidence preferences
Traceable agricultural supply chain
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016824014479
work_keys_str_mv AT chongfenglan pricingstrategyoftraceableagriculturalsupplychaindecisionsconsideringretailersoverconfidencewithgovernmentsubsidy
AT yarulan pricingstrategyoftraceableagriculturalsupplychaindecisionsconsideringretailersoverconfidencewithgovernmentsubsidy
AT shengdeliu pricingstrategyoftraceableagriculturalsupplychaindecisionsconsideringretailersoverconfidencewithgovernmentsubsidy