Evolutionary game model for the behavior of private sectors in elderly healthcare public–private partnership under the condition of information asymmetry

Evolutionary game model for the behavior of private sectors in elderly healthcare public–private partnership under the condition of information asymmetry

Abstract Chinese elderly healthcare services face problems of poor service quality, difficulty in eliminating hidden quality risks, and inadequate government supervision, primarily due to information asymmetry and insufficient supervision among providers, users, and regulatory bodies. The study addr...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Xianghua Yue, Shahzad Khan Durrani, Runfa Li, Wenling Liu, Shahid Manzoor, Muhammad Khalid Anser
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: BMC 2025-01-01
Series:BMC Health Services Research
Subjects:
Information asymmetry
Elderly healthcare PPP project
The third-party evaluation
Public participation
Reputation incentive
Evolutionary game
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-025-12321-8
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https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-025-12321-8

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