Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People
With the background of aging, ensuring the deep integration of pension and medical services and effectively integrating pension resources and medical resources are hot issues that must be addressed in the current mode of integrating health and care services for older people. Thus, we use game theory...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5846794 |
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| _version_ | 1832565991161200640 |
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| author | Tingqiang Chen Jinnan Pan Yuanping He Jining Wang |
| author_facet | Tingqiang Chen Jinnan Pan Yuanping He Jining Wang |
| author_sort | Tingqiang Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the background of aging, ensuring the deep integration of pension and medical services and effectively integrating pension resources and medical resources are hot issues that must be addressed in the current mode of integrating health and care services for older people. Thus, we use game theory to construct the utility model of resource allocation between pension and medical institutions. We apply this model to explore how pension institutions and medical institutions invest resources into the integration of health and care services, analysis of influencing factors, and conducting incentive mechanism research by using MATLAB 2016b software. Through theoretical deduction and experimental analysis, the following conclusions are drawn. First, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with the level of labor input, and its growth rate has a marginal diminishing effect on the level of labor. Second, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with fixed asset investment regardless of the different effort coefficients between medical institutions and pension institutions. With a high income distribution coefficient, pension institutions are negatively correlated and marginally decrease. Third, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with medical institutions’ labor input level. When the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions reaches a certain value, it is negatively correlated with the labor input level of medical institutions, thereby showing a marginal diminishing effect. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-4eebe751e85f4bf2a4b4114d7f780e31 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-4eebe751e85f4bf2a4b4114d7f780e312025-02-03T01:05:22ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/58467945846794Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder PeopleTingqiang Chen0Jinnan Pan1Yuanping He2Jining Wang3School of Economic and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaSchool of Economic and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaSchool of Economic and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaSchool of Economic and Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, ChinaWith the background of aging, ensuring the deep integration of pension and medical services and effectively integrating pension resources and medical resources are hot issues that must be addressed in the current mode of integrating health and care services for older people. Thus, we use game theory to construct the utility model of resource allocation between pension and medical institutions. We apply this model to explore how pension institutions and medical institutions invest resources into the integration of health and care services, analysis of influencing factors, and conducting incentive mechanism research by using MATLAB 2016b software. Through theoretical deduction and experimental analysis, the following conclusions are drawn. First, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with the level of labor input, and its growth rate has a marginal diminishing effect on the level of labor. Second, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with fixed asset investment regardless of the different effort coefficients between medical institutions and pension institutions. With a high income distribution coefficient, pension institutions are negatively correlated and marginally decrease. Third, in early investment, the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions is positively correlated with medical institutions’ labor input level. When the income distribution coefficient of pension institutions reaches a certain value, it is negatively correlated with the labor input level of medical institutions, thereby showing a marginal diminishing effect.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5846794 |
| spellingShingle | Tingqiang Chen Jinnan Pan Yuanping He Jining Wang Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People Complexity |
| title | Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People |
| title_full | Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People |
| title_fullStr | Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People |
| title_short | Evolutionary Game Model of Integrating Health and Care Services for Elder People |
| title_sort | evolutionary game model of integrating health and care services for elder people |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/5846794 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tingqiangchen evolutionarygamemodelofintegratinghealthandcareservicesforelderpeople AT jinnanpan evolutionarygamemodelofintegratinghealthandcareservicesforelderpeople AT yuanpinghe evolutionarygamemodelofintegratinghealthandcareservicesforelderpeople AT jiningwang evolutionarygamemodelofintegratinghealthandcareservicesforelderpeople |