The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism

One issue that permeated Gilded Age politics asks to what extent the United States Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business. Most of today’s scholars treat it as a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against government power, and maintain that this balanci...

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Main Author: Paul Kens
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Association Française d'Etudes Américaines 2014-02-01
Series:Transatlantica
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.openedition.org/transatlantica/6473
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author Paul Kens
author_facet Paul Kens
author_sort Paul Kens
collection DOAJ
description One issue that permeated Gilded Age politics asks to what extent the United States Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business. Most of today’s scholars treat it as a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against government power, and maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant tradition in constitutional history, dating at least as far back as the Jacksonian era. On the contrary this paper shows that prior to the late 1880s the paradigm for determining the constitution’s limits on government regulation of business was actually quite different. The Supreme Court in its first century treated business regulation as a matter of balancing entrepreneurial liberty against the rights of the community. Furthermore, it consistently held that, because state economic regulations were an expression of popular sovereignty and rights of the community, they should be presumed to be valid. Only at the very end of the nineteenth century did this interpretation give way to a new one, raising entrepreneurial liberty to preferred status under the Constitution. This was the result of the persistent efforts of lawyers for the corporate elite, who aimed to produced three changes: a tendency to equate regulation of business with confiscation of property; a trend toward expanding the constitutional rights afforded to corporations; and a reversal of the rule that economic regulation should be presumed valid. But at least until the death of Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite in 1888, the Supreme Court would rather steadfastly cling to the traditional doctrine than promote this new interpretation.
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spelling doaj-art-40bc6a8a2bdf4a908ddf870d2dc75d3f2025-01-30T10:44:04ZengAssociation Française d'Etudes AméricainesTransatlantica1765-27662014-02-01110.4000/transatlantica.6473The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American LiberalismPaul KensOne issue that permeated Gilded Age politics asks to what extent the United States Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business. Most of today’s scholars treat it as a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against government power, and maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant tradition in constitutional history, dating at least as far back as the Jacksonian era. On the contrary this paper shows that prior to the late 1880s the paradigm for determining the constitution’s limits on government regulation of business was actually quite different. The Supreme Court in its first century treated business regulation as a matter of balancing entrepreneurial liberty against the rights of the community. Furthermore, it consistently held that, because state economic regulations were an expression of popular sovereignty and rights of the community, they should be presumed to be valid. Only at the very end of the nineteenth century did this interpretation give way to a new one, raising entrepreneurial liberty to preferred status under the Constitution. This was the result of the persistent efforts of lawyers for the corporate elite, who aimed to produced three changes: a tendency to equate regulation of business with confiscation of property; a trend toward expanding the constitutional rights afforded to corporations; and a reversal of the rule that economic regulation should be presumed valid. But at least until the death of Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite in 1888, the Supreme Court would rather steadfastly cling to the traditional doctrine than promote this new interpretation.https://journals.openedition.org/transatlantica/6473Supreme Courtbusiness regulationMorrison R. WaiteConstitutionGilded AgeState
spellingShingle Paul Kens
The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
Transatlantica
Supreme Court
business regulation
Morrison R. Waite
Constitution
Gilded Age
State
title The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
title_full The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
title_fullStr The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
title_full_unstemmed The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
title_short The United States Supreme Court and Business Elites: Gilded Age Origins of Modern American Liberalism
title_sort united states supreme court and business elites gilded age origins of modern american liberalism
topic Supreme Court
business regulation
Morrison R. Waite
Constitution
Gilded Age
State
url https://journals.openedition.org/transatlantica/6473
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