Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation

Energy-intensive enterprises have two main options for reducing their carbon emissions: design and implement carbon reduction projects on their own, or enter into cooperate contracts with energy service companies (ESCOs). In this paper, we discuss an energy-intensive enterprise facing independent an...

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Main Authors: Chunyi Ji, Binjia Chen, Wei Zhao, Xinyue Wang, Wuyong Qian
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2025-02-01
Series:Heliyon
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Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844025008047
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author Chunyi Ji
Binjia Chen
Wei Zhao
Xinyue Wang
Wuyong Qian
author_facet Chunyi Ji
Binjia Chen
Wei Zhao
Xinyue Wang
Wuyong Qian
author_sort Chunyi Ji
collection DOAJ
description Energy-intensive enterprises have two main options for reducing their carbon emissions: design and implement carbon reduction projects on their own, or enter into cooperate contracts with energy service companies (ESCOs). In this paper, we discuss an energy-intensive enterprise facing independent and cooperative carbon emission reduction options and how the manufacturer chooses the optimal mode under the two-stage dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation. We construct a basic supply chain consisting of an energy-intensive manufacturer and a retailer and compare the equilibrium results under four scenarios of carbon reduction modes based on the Stackelberg game theory. The research results show that under each of the dynamic carbon allowance trading stages, the choice of emission reduction modes depends on the emission reduction level of ESCOs. Under the second stage of the dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation, energy-intensive manufactures can ensure profits by increasing their own emission reduction level, regardless of the emission reduction modes they choose. To appropriately increase the initial carbon allowance in the first stage, and increase the carbon allowance constraint coefficient in the second stage, can effectively improve the carbon emission reduction rate of enterprises, which proves that the dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation is beneficial to manufacturers with higher levels of emission reductions and can facilitate manufacturers to increase their carbon emission reduction rates.
format Article
id doaj-art-3ede05a3381342018ccf01509ef6d8f6
institution Kabale University
issn 2405-8440
language English
publishDate 2025-02-01
publisher Elsevier
record_format Article
series Heliyon
spelling doaj-art-3ede05a3381342018ccf01509ef6d8f62025-02-06T05:12:37ZengElsevierHeliyon2405-84402025-02-01113e42424Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulationChunyi Ji0Binjia Chen1Wei Zhao2Xinyue Wang3Wuyong Qian4Corresponding author.; School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, ChinaSchool of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, ChinaSchool of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, ChinaSchool of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, ChinaSchool of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, ChinaEnergy-intensive enterprises have two main options for reducing their carbon emissions: design and implement carbon reduction projects on their own, or enter into cooperate contracts with energy service companies (ESCOs). In this paper, we discuss an energy-intensive enterprise facing independent and cooperative carbon emission reduction options and how the manufacturer chooses the optimal mode under the two-stage dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation. We construct a basic supply chain consisting of an energy-intensive manufacturer and a retailer and compare the equilibrium results under four scenarios of carbon reduction modes based on the Stackelberg game theory. The research results show that under each of the dynamic carbon allowance trading stages, the choice of emission reduction modes depends on the emission reduction level of ESCOs. Under the second stage of the dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation, energy-intensive manufactures can ensure profits by increasing their own emission reduction level, regardless of the emission reduction modes they choose. To appropriately increase the initial carbon allowance in the first stage, and increase the carbon allowance constraint coefficient in the second stage, can effectively improve the carbon emission reduction rate of enterprises, which proves that the dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation is beneficial to manufacturers with higher levels of emission reductions and can facilitate manufacturers to increase their carbon emission reduction rates.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844025008047Dynamic carbon allowance trading regulationSelection of emission reduction modesStackelberg gameEnergy service company
spellingShingle Chunyi Ji
Binjia Chen
Wei Zhao
Xinyue Wang
Wuyong Qian
Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
Heliyon
Dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation
Selection of emission reduction modes
Stackelberg game
Energy service company
title Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
title_full Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
title_fullStr Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
title_full_unstemmed Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
title_short Selection of emission reduction modes for energy-intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap-and-trade regulation
title_sort selection of emission reduction modes for energy intensive enterprises under the dynamic carbon cap and trade regulation
topic Dynamic carbon allowance trading regulation
Selection of emission reduction modes
Stackelberg game
Energy service company
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844025008047
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AT binjiachen selectionofemissionreductionmodesforenergyintensiveenterprisesunderthedynamiccarboncapandtraderegulation
AT weizhao selectionofemissionreductionmodesforenergyintensiveenterprisesunderthedynamiccarboncapandtraderegulation
AT xinyuewang selectionofemissionreductionmodesforenergyintensiveenterprisesunderthedynamiccarboncapandtraderegulation
AT wuyongqian selectionofemissionreductionmodesforenergyintensiveenterprisesunderthedynamiccarboncapandtraderegulation