The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion
Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6309545 |
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| _version_ | 1832546996139851776 |
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| author | Lixia Liu Yuchao Zhu Shubing Guo |
| author_facet | Lixia Liu Yuchao Zhu Shubing Guo |
| author_sort | Lixia Liu |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-27766c1a2c9142c5b0f27ee4aa881dca |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-27766c1a2c9142c5b0f27ee4aa881dca2025-02-03T06:46:23ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/63095456309545The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation DiffusionLixia Liu0Yuchao Zhu1Shubing Guo2School of Economics, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, ChinaSchool of Economics, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, ChinaCollege of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaEncouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6309545 |
| spellingShingle | Lixia Liu Yuchao Zhu Shubing Guo The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion Complexity |
| title | The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion |
| title_full | The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion |
| title_fullStr | The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion |
| title_short | The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion |
| title_sort | evolutionary game analysis of multiple stakeholders in the low carbon agricultural innovation diffusion |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6309545 |
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