Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model
Although haze risk management is mainly under government control, willingness of stakeholders is compulsory to determine. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite game model of government, public, and enterprises and determines the haze risk evolution model considering the initial willingness o...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2020-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6474363 |
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| _version_ | 1832567348650835968 |
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| author | Chaoyu Zheng Benhong Peng XinSheng Ehsan Elahi Anxia Wan |
| author_facet | Chaoyu Zheng Benhong Peng XinSheng Ehsan Elahi Anxia Wan |
| author_sort | Chaoyu Zheng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Although haze risk management is mainly under government control, willingness of stakeholders is compulsory to determine. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite game model of government, public, and enterprises and determines the haze risk evolution model considering the initial willingness of stakeholders. Moreover, numerical simulation analysis was also conducted. The results revealed that stakeholders were affected by the change due to initial willingness to participate in and reach the equilibrium at different speeds. It is found that if subsidy coefficient of the government is big, it will reach equilibrium faster. The bigger the penalty coefficient is, the better the pollution reduction effect of pollutant discharge enterprises. It is found that, at the final equilibrium stage, the government will eventually choose to withdraw from supervision, but the speed of withdrawing varies with different regulatory intentions. Study results stress that the government should actively participate in supervision to reduce environmental pollution. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-fc6060fc68b44086bc1f19da96f0931f |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-fc6060fc68b44086bc1f19da96f0931f2025-02-03T01:01:52ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262020-01-01202010.1155/2020/64743636474363Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game ModelChaoyu Zheng0Benhong Peng1XinSheng2Ehsan Elahi3Anxia Wan4Binjiang College, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Wuxi 214105, ChinaBinjiang College, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Wuxi 214105, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, ChinaSchool of Business, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, ChinaAlthough haze risk management is mainly under government control, willingness of stakeholders is compulsory to determine. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite game model of government, public, and enterprises and determines the haze risk evolution model considering the initial willingness of stakeholders. Moreover, numerical simulation analysis was also conducted. The results revealed that stakeholders were affected by the change due to initial willingness to participate in and reach the equilibrium at different speeds. It is found that if subsidy coefficient of the government is big, it will reach equilibrium faster. The bigger the penalty coefficient is, the better the pollution reduction effect of pollutant discharge enterprises. It is found that, at the final equilibrium stage, the government will eventually choose to withdraw from supervision, but the speed of withdrawing varies with different regulatory intentions. Study results stress that the government should actively participate in supervision to reduce environmental pollution.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6474363 |
| spellingShingle | Chaoyu Zheng Benhong Peng XinSheng Ehsan Elahi Anxia Wan Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model Complexity |
| title | Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model |
| title_full | Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model |
| title_fullStr | Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model |
| title_short | Strategies of Haze Risk Reduction Using the Tripartite Game Model |
| title_sort | strategies of haze risk reduction using the tripartite game model |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6474363 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chaoyuzheng strategiesofhazeriskreductionusingthetripartitegamemodel AT benhongpeng strategiesofhazeriskreductionusingthetripartitegamemodel AT xinsheng strategiesofhazeriskreductionusingthetripartitegamemodel AT ehsanelahi strategiesofhazeriskreductionusingthetripartitegamemodel AT anxiawan strategiesofhazeriskreductionusingthetripartitegamemodel |