R. V. Cuhna. Will I ever be a Cyborg? / trans. from Engl. R. L. Kochnev
Eric Olson’s animalist view relies on the premise that person is not a fit candidate to be a substance concept, in Wiggins’s terminology. Instead, he claims, animal is what best serves as the answer to what we most fundamentally are and what determines our persistence conditions. Pro-posing a tho...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2023-05-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%96%202%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/106-115%20%D0%A0%D1%83%D0%B9%20%D0%92%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%80%D0%B0%20%D0%B4%D0%B0%20%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%BD%D1%8C%D1%8F%20.pdf |
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| Summary: | Eric Olson’s animalist view relies on the premise that person is not a fit candidate to
be a substance concept, in Wiggins’s terminology. Instead, he claims, animal is what
best serves as the answer to what we most fundamentally are and what determines
our persistence conditions. Pro-posing a thought experiment concerning inorganic
replacement, I aim to show that Olson’s animalist view cannot accommodate our
very strong intuitions about such cases. My claim is then that animalism either fails on
its own grounds or requires some tuning regarding what exactly an organism is and
its persistence conditions. I will examine Matthew Liao’s attempt to accommodate
such intuitions within an animalist view. I will also describe the basics about Olson’s
animalist view but let us first look at the rough outline of my thought experiment.
The essentials are as follows, the rest I will provide later, as we go along. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |