Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects
With the development of building information technology, Building Information Modeling (BIM) has become an important way to effectively solve the cross-organization information collaboration of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, and how to promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects has beco...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5553785 |
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| _version_ | 1832548857628590080 |
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| author | Chong Jia Ruixue Zhang Dan Wang |
| author_facet | Chong Jia Ruixue Zhang Dan Wang |
| author_sort | Chong Jia |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | With the development of building information technology, Building Information Modeling (BIM) has become an important way to effectively solve the cross-organization information collaboration of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, and how to promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects has become a realistic problem to be solved urgently. This study discusses the adoption of BIM among stakeholders in PPP projects based on prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model including governments, social capitals, and contractors is established. The behavioral evolution mechanism of each stakeholder on BIM adoption is explored by analyzing the evolutionary equilibrium, and the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy are analyzed by using numerical simulation. The results demonstrate that first, the degree of the cost to all stakeholders involved in the adoption of BIM, as well as the punishment for governments’ passive promotion of BIM, the punishment for social capitals’ passive adoption of BIM and the reward for contractors’ active application of BIM are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, according to prospect theory, the main stakeholders usually make decisions through subjective judgment and perceived value which ultimately lead to deviation in their behaviors. The deviations will hinder the establishment of ESS point (1, 1, 1) and make the system difficult to converge to the optimal state. Finally, from the perspective of governments, social capitals, and contractors, countermeasures and management implications are put forward to effectively promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-f344fdb53c28446daa23e64be61ab056 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-f344fdb53c28446daa23e64be61ab0562025-02-03T06:12:51ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55537855553785Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP ProjectsChong Jia0Ruixue Zhang1Dan Wang2School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125105, ChinaWith the development of building information technology, Building Information Modeling (BIM) has become an important way to effectively solve the cross-organization information collaboration of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects, and how to promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects has become a realistic problem to be solved urgently. This study discusses the adoption of BIM among stakeholders in PPP projects based on prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model including governments, social capitals, and contractors is established. The behavioral evolution mechanism of each stakeholder on BIM adoption is explored by analyzing the evolutionary equilibrium, and the key influencing factors of equilibrium strategy are analyzed by using numerical simulation. The results demonstrate that first, the degree of the cost to all stakeholders involved in the adoption of BIM, as well as the punishment for governments’ passive promotion of BIM, the punishment for social capitals’ passive adoption of BIM and the reward for contractors’ active application of BIM are the key factors affecting evolutionary stability. Second, according to prospect theory, the main stakeholders usually make decisions through subjective judgment and perceived value which ultimately lead to deviation in their behaviors. The deviations will hinder the establishment of ESS point (1, 1, 1) and make the system difficult to converge to the optimal state. Finally, from the perspective of governments, social capitals, and contractors, countermeasures and management implications are put forward to effectively promote the adoption of BIM in PPP projects.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5553785 |
| spellingShingle | Chong Jia Ruixue Zhang Dan Wang Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects Complexity |
| title | Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects |
| title_full | Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects |
| title_fullStr | Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects |
| title_short | Evolutionary Game Analysis of BIM Adoption among Stakeholders in PPP Projects |
| title_sort | evolutionary game analysis of bim adoption among stakeholders in ppp projects |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5553785 |
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