Sécurité aux frontières : Portée et limites de la stratégie algérienne
This article analyzes the Algerian State’s border security strategy. Their increasing instability forces it to be one of the most involved actors in the maintenance of regional security. The country bears the burden of a war effort without being effectively at war. In the context of the Libyan and M...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fra |
| Published: |
CNRS Éditions
2016-06-01
|
| Series: | L’Année du Maghreb |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/anneemaghreb/2712 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | This article analyzes the Algerian State’s border security strategy. Their increasing instability forces it to be one of the most involved actors in the maintenance of regional security. The country bears the burden of a war effort without being effectively at war. In the context of the Libyan and Malian crises, border security has become a major concern for the Algerian authorities. The question of border security is also the object of a construction and securitization process that serves both domestic and international purposes. This article analyzes, from a constructivist perspective, the constructed and instrumental aspects of several notions (security, threat, border, terrorism). The Algerian strategy has been developing on three levels: the implantation of a border security system and the restructuration of armed and security forces; the development of bilateral processes of cooperation with neighboring countries; the development of multilateral processes through the initiative des pays du Champ. This strategy is guided by three cardinal principles: the non-intervention in the internal affairs of States; the non-intervention of the Algerian armed forces outside the national territory; the endogenous management of regional security issues (i.e. the rejection of any form of external intervention). Despite its contribution to securing the border strip, however, this strategy is still limited for several reasons: the State-centric orientation found whenever dealing with specific issues; the inoperativeness of some cardinal principles in an evolving context characterized by the affirmation of non-state actors; the mutations of the terrorist phenomenon; a highly unstable regional context; a lack of strategic convergence in the region. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1952-8108 2109-9405 |