Ananlysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Power Dominance between Single Manufacturer and Single Retailer in Regulatory Cap and Trade System
In the cap and trade system, the paper analyses the Stackelberg game between the power asymmetrical retailer and manufacturer and designs a side-payment self-enforcing contract to resolve some arguments that the existing research overemphasizes spontaneity of participation in side-payment contracts...
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Main Authors: | Liang-jie Xia, Hua-wei Zhi |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/523451 |
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