The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service
Based on the analysis of the shortage of emergency rescue services and the supervision of public-private-partnership (PPP) projects, this paper explores the rent-seeking game predicament and establishes a three-player rent-seeking game model among government regulators, private enterprises, and gove...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8413786 |
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| _version_ | 1832550943810387968 |
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| author | Guangxi Cao Ling Zhou |
| author_facet | Guangxi Cao Ling Zhou |
| author_sort | Guangxi Cao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Based on the analysis of the shortage of emergency rescue services and the supervision of public-private-partnership (PPP) projects, this paper explores the rent-seeking game predicament and establishes a three-player rent-seeking game model among government regulators, private enterprises, and government agents in the bidding operation of PPP projects by learning from Stackelberg game theory. Through the numerical simulation analysis, this paper explores the impact of the relevant variables on the model results, which can lead to the following conclusions: the emphasis on government regulators changes due to rent-seeking cost changes; when the success rate of verification is high, government regulators can take supervision randomly. Inversely, supervision channels should be broadened when the supervision fails. When the punishment on government agents and private enterprises is great, relaxing supervision may be appropriate. This study proposes the relevant policy recommendations for government regulators to improve their work. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e4bac24b1e8346f980ff7cc91d8986e3 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-e4bac24b1e8346f980ff7cc91d8986e32025-02-03T06:05:26ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/84137868413786The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue ServiceGuangxi Cao0Ling Zhou1School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Ningliu Road 219, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210044, ChinaSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Ningliu Road 219, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210044, ChinaBased on the analysis of the shortage of emergency rescue services and the supervision of public-private-partnership (PPP) projects, this paper explores the rent-seeking game predicament and establishes a three-player rent-seeking game model among government regulators, private enterprises, and government agents in the bidding operation of PPP projects by learning from Stackelberg game theory. Through the numerical simulation analysis, this paper explores the impact of the relevant variables on the model results, which can lead to the following conclusions: the emphasis on government regulators changes due to rent-seeking cost changes; when the success rate of verification is high, government regulators can take supervision randomly. Inversely, supervision channels should be broadened when the supervision fails. When the punishment on government agents and private enterprises is great, relaxing supervision may be appropriate. This study proposes the relevant policy recommendations for government regulators to improve their work.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8413786 |
| spellingShingle | Guangxi Cao Ling Zhou The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service |
| title_full | The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service |
| title_fullStr | The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service |
| title_short | The Optimal PPP Model of Emergency Rescue Service |
| title_sort | optimal ppp model of emergency rescue service |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8413786 |
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