Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordinati...

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Main Authors: Lufeng Dai, Xifu Wang, Xiaoguang Liu, Lai Wei
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2019-01-01
Series:Complexity
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1484372
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author Lufeng Dai
Xifu Wang
Xiaoguang Liu
Lai Wei
author_facet Lufeng Dai
Xifu Wang
Xiaoguang Liu
Lai Wei
author_sort Lufeng Dai
collection DOAJ
description Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.
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institution Kabale University
issn 1076-2787
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language English
publishDate 2019-01-01
publisher Wiley
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spelling doaj-art-e4b9d435146740449e68290dd15e3ad12025-02-03T06:04:56ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262019-01-01201910.1155/2019/14843721484372Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring RetailerLufeng Dai0Xifu Wang1Xiaoguang Liu2Lai Wei3School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, ChinaSchool of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, ChinaManufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1484372
spellingShingle Lufeng Dai
Xifu Wang
Xiaoguang Liu
Lai Wei
Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
Complexity
title Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
title_full Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
title_fullStr Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
title_full_unstemmed Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
title_short Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer
title_sort pricing strategies in dual channel supply chain with a fair caring retailer
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/1484372
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AT xiaoguangliu pricingstrategiesindualchannelsupplychainwithafaircaringretailer
AT laiwei pricingstrategiesindualchannelsupplychainwithafaircaringretailer