Regulating a Firm under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Uncertain Environment
This paper investigates a problem of how to regulate a firm which has private information about the market capacity, leading to adverse selection, and which can increase the market demand by exerting costly effort, resulting in moral hazard. In such a setting, the regulator offers a regulatory polic...
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Main Authors: | Jing Feng, Yanfei Lan, Ruiqing Zhao |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2014-01-01
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Series: | Abstract and Applied Analysis |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/419207 |
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