The Analysis of Opinion Evolution and Control Based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in Social Networks
In a social network, a user is greatly influenced by their neighbors’ opinions, and the user’s opinion updating can be regarded as the prisoner’s dilemma game. In view of such considerations, this paper proposes an opinion evolution and control model based on the prisoner’s dilemma game and gives th...
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Main Authors: | Xianyong Li, Jian Zhu, Yajun Du, Qian Zhang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6667187 |
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