New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters

In the real business world, player sometimes would offer a limiter to their output due to capacity constraints, financial constraints, or cautious response to uncertainty in the world. In this paper, we modify a duopoly game with bounded rationality by imposing lower limiters on output. Within our m...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Zhaohan Sheng, Jianguo Du, Qiang Mei, Tingwen Huang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2013-01-01
Series:Abstract and Applied Analysis
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/406743
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1832561942048276480
author Zhaohan Sheng
Jianguo Du
Qiang Mei
Tingwen Huang
author_facet Zhaohan Sheng
Jianguo Du
Qiang Mei
Tingwen Huang
author_sort Zhaohan Sheng
collection DOAJ
description In the real business world, player sometimes would offer a limiter to their output due to capacity constraints, financial constraints, or cautious response to uncertainty in the world. In this paper, we modify a duopoly game with bounded rationality by imposing lower limiters on output. Within our model, we analyze how lower limiters have an effect on dynamics of output and give proof in theory why adding lower limiters can suppress chaos. We also explore the numbers of the equilibrium points and the distribution of conditioned equilibrium points. Stable region of the conditioned equilibrium is discussed. Numerical experiments show that the output evolution system having lower limiters becomes more robust than without them, and chaos disappears if the lower limiters are big enough. The local or global stability of the conditional equilibrium points provides a theoretical basis for the limiter control method of chaos in economic systems.
format Article
id doaj-art-e0c3c4dfe77e4742956428d1d7e23249
institution Kabale University
issn 1085-3375
1687-0409
language English
publishDate 2013-01-01
publisher Wiley
record_format Article
series Abstract and Applied Analysis
spelling doaj-art-e0c3c4dfe77e4742956428d1d7e232492025-02-03T01:23:57ZengWileyAbstract and Applied Analysis1085-33751687-04092013-01-01201310.1155/2013/406743406743New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower LimitersZhaohan Sheng0Jianguo Du1Qiang Mei2Tingwen Huang3School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, ChinaSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, ChinaSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, ChinaTexas A&M University at Qatar, P.O. Box 23874, Doha, QatarIn the real business world, player sometimes would offer a limiter to their output due to capacity constraints, financial constraints, or cautious response to uncertainty in the world. In this paper, we modify a duopoly game with bounded rationality by imposing lower limiters on output. Within our model, we analyze how lower limiters have an effect on dynamics of output and give proof in theory why adding lower limiters can suppress chaos. We also explore the numbers of the equilibrium points and the distribution of conditioned equilibrium points. Stable region of the conditioned equilibrium is discussed. Numerical experiments show that the output evolution system having lower limiters becomes more robust than without them, and chaos disappears if the lower limiters are big enough. The local or global stability of the conditional equilibrium points provides a theoretical basis for the limiter control method of chaos in economic systems.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/406743
spellingShingle Zhaohan Sheng
Jianguo Du
Qiang Mei
Tingwen Huang
New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
Abstract and Applied Analysis
title New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
title_full New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
title_fullStr New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
title_full_unstemmed New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
title_short New Analyses of Duopoly Game with Output Lower Limiters
title_sort new analyses of duopoly game with output lower limiters
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/406743
work_keys_str_mv AT zhaohansheng newanalysesofduopolygamewithoutputlowerlimiters
AT jianguodu newanalysesofduopolygamewithoutputlowerlimiters
AT qiangmei newanalysesofduopolygamewithoutputlowerlimiters
AT tingwenhuang newanalysesofduopolygamewithoutputlowerlimiters