Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence

The article is devoted to the discussion about the relationship between knowledge and skill. This discussion arose within the critique of dualism. It is believed that dualism presupposes an intellectualism in which knowledge-how always derived from knowledge-that. The article proposes a method of...

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Main Authors: T. S. Demin, K. G. Frolov
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education 2023-02-01
Series:Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%961%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-109%20%20%D0%94%D1%91%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%A2.%20%D0%A1.,%20%D0%A4%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%9A.%20%D0%93..pdf
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author T. S. Demin
K. G. Frolov
author_facet T. S. Demin
K. G. Frolov
author_sort T. S. Demin
collection DOAJ
description The article is devoted to the discussion about the relationship between knowledge and skill. This discussion arose within the critique of dualism. It is believed that dualism presupposes an intellectualism in which knowledge-how always derived from knowledge-that. The article proposes a method of distinguishing knowledgehow and knowledge-that through characteristic properties. This method allows us to draw a strict boundary between the two types of knowledge. This is followed by an explanation of the relationship between the two types of knowledge through the inclusion of knowledge-how as a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge-that. In the final part of the article, the principle of indistinguishability of knowledge-how among different agents is introduced, on the basis of which it is argued that the division into knowledge-how and knowledge-that works in the interests of dualism, and not vice versa, as supposed by Gilbert Ryle. This division makes sense in light of the Chinese room argument and the demonstration of the difference between humans and weak artificial intelligence.
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institution Kabale University
issn 2542-0488
2541-7983
language English
publishDate 2023-02-01
publisher Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
record_format Article
series Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
spelling doaj-art-dfe79c1aa9fb4e09890326496cea2d732025-02-03T06:42:34ZengOmsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher EducationОмский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"2542-04882541-79832023-02-018110210910.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-1-102-109Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligenceT. S. Demin0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0973-2756K. G. Frolov1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9071-6138Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University «LETI»HSE University; Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University «LETI»The article is devoted to the discussion about the relationship between knowledge and skill. This discussion arose within the critique of dualism. It is believed that dualism presupposes an intellectualism in which knowledge-how always derived from knowledge-that. The article proposes a method of distinguishing knowledgehow and knowledge-that through characteristic properties. This method allows us to draw a strict boundary between the two types of knowledge. This is followed by an explanation of the relationship between the two types of knowledge through the inclusion of knowledge-how as a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge-that. In the final part of the article, the principle of indistinguishability of knowledge-how among different agents is introduced, on the basis of which it is argued that the division into knowledge-how and knowledge-that works in the interests of dualism, and not vice versa, as supposed by Gilbert Ryle. This division makes sense in light of the Chinese room argument and the demonstration of the difference between humans and weak artificial intelligence.https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%961%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-109%20%20%D0%94%D1%91%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%A2.%20%D0%A1.,%20%D0%A4%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%9A.%20%D0%93..pdfepistemologyknowledge-thatknowledge-howskillartificial intelligence
spellingShingle T. S. Demin
K. G. Frolov
Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность"
epistemology
knowledge-that
knowledge-how
skill
artificial intelligence
title Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
title_full Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
title_fullStr Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
title_full_unstemmed Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
title_short Knowledge-that, Knowledge-how, consciousness and artificial intelligence
title_sort knowledge that knowledge how consciousness and artificial intelligence
topic epistemology
knowledge-that
knowledge-how
skill
artificial intelligence
url https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2023/%D0%A2.8,%20%E2%84%961%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/102-109%20%20%D0%94%D1%91%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%20%D0%A2.%20%D0%A1.,%20%D0%A4%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%9A.%20%D0%93..pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT tsdemin knowledgethatknowledgehowconsciousnessandartificialintelligence
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