A new solution to the rational voter paradox

The rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs. However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligib...

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Main Authors: Mladenović Ivan, Vasić Miljan
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade 2024-01-01
Series:Filozofija i Društvo
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404957M.pdf
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author Mladenović Ivan
Vasić Miljan
author_facet Mladenović Ivan
Vasić Miljan
author_sort Mladenović Ivan
collection DOAJ
description The rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs. However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligible. In response to the paradox, this paper proposes a novel solution based on Goldman’s causal responsibility approach, which asserts that voters make a partial causal contribution to the electoral outcome even if their vote is not decisive. The paper integrates the logic of Condorcet’s jury theorem into the causal responsibility approach, arguing that this leads to solving the rational voter paradox.
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institution Kabale University
issn 0353-5738
2334-8577
language deu
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publisher Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
record_format Article
series Filozofija i Društvo
spelling doaj-art-df0ea71d4fe64a29a7acf49511fe4e842025-01-30T06:45:06ZdeuInstitute for Philosophy and Social Theory, BelgradeFilozofija i Društvo0353-57382334-85772024-01-0135495797810.2298/FID2404957M0353-57382404957MA new solution to the rational voter paradoxMladenović Ivan0Vasić Miljan1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2161-7977Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of BelgradeInstitute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of BelgradeThe rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs. However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligible. In response to the paradox, this paper proposes a novel solution based on Goldman’s causal responsibility approach, which asserts that voters make a partial causal contribution to the electoral outcome even if their vote is not decisive. The paper integrates the logic of Condorcet’s jury theorem into the causal responsibility approach, arguing that this leads to solving the rational voter paradox.https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404957M.pdfrationalitycausal responsibilitydemocratic decision-makingcondorcet’s jury theoremnormative reasons for voting
spellingShingle Mladenović Ivan
Vasić Miljan
A new solution to the rational voter paradox
Filozofija i Društvo
rationality
causal responsibility
democratic decision-making
condorcet’s jury theorem
normative reasons for voting
title A new solution to the rational voter paradox
title_full A new solution to the rational voter paradox
title_fullStr A new solution to the rational voter paradox
title_full_unstemmed A new solution to the rational voter paradox
title_short A new solution to the rational voter paradox
title_sort new solution to the rational voter paradox
topic rationality
causal responsibility
democratic decision-making
condorcet’s jury theorem
normative reasons for voting
url https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404957M.pdf
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AT vasicmiljan anewsolutiontotherationalvoterparadox
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