Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation

A good partnership is conducive to promoting the empowerment of manufacturing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) via industrial Internet platforms. By analyzing the factors influencing the cooperation motives of both parties and individual behavior, this paper puts forward the design of a co...

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Main Authors: Dongdong Li, Chunfa Li, Runde Gu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2021-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4706719
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author Dongdong Li
Chunfa Li
Runde Gu
author_facet Dongdong Li
Chunfa Li
Runde Gu
author_sort Dongdong Li
collection DOAJ
description A good partnership is conducive to promoting the empowerment of manufacturing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) via industrial Internet platforms. By analyzing the factors influencing the cooperation motives of both parties and individual behavior, this paper puts forward the design of a cost-sharing and scale revenue-sharing mechanism and establishes an evolutionary game model. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of individuals and the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system are analyzed. The results show that the key factors affecting the strategic choices of industrial Internet platforms and manufacturing SMEs are different and will change with the number of platform customers and the level of digitalization of enterprises. By sharing the access cost of SMEs and the scale revenue of the platform, mutual trust between the two parties can be enhanced, and SMEs will be more motivated to access the platform. Moreover, the platform network externality, customer churn risk, and cost-sharing ratio have different influences on the process of reaching evolutionary equilibrium in the system. Collaborative revenue expectations are critical to the behavioral strategies of both parties. In comprehensive consideration of the results of this study, it is recommended that industrial Internet platforms be subsidized in the initial stage of cooperation.
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spelling doaj-art-ddd8f3e502094b9ea23987d1b6e114b22025-02-03T01:24:42ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/47067194706719Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation CooperationDongdong Li0Chunfa Li1Runde Gu2School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, ChinaSchool of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, ChinaSchool of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, ChinaA good partnership is conducive to promoting the empowerment of manufacturing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) via industrial Internet platforms. By analyzing the factors influencing the cooperation motives of both parties and individual behavior, this paper puts forward the design of a cost-sharing and scale revenue-sharing mechanism and establishes an evolutionary game model. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of individuals and the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system are analyzed. The results show that the key factors affecting the strategic choices of industrial Internet platforms and manufacturing SMEs are different and will change with the number of platform customers and the level of digitalization of enterprises. By sharing the access cost of SMEs and the scale revenue of the platform, mutual trust between the two parties can be enhanced, and SMEs will be more motivated to access the platform. Moreover, the platform network externality, customer churn risk, and cost-sharing ratio have different influences on the process of reaching evolutionary equilibrium in the system. Collaborative revenue expectations are critical to the behavioral strategies of both parties. In comprehensive consideration of the results of this study, it is recommended that industrial Internet platforms be subsidized in the initial stage of cooperation.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4706719
spellingShingle Dongdong Li
Chunfa Li
Runde Gu
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
title_full Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
title_fullStr Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
title_short Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation
title_sort evolutionary game analysis of promoting industrial internet platforms to empower manufacturing smes through value cocreation cooperation
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/4706719
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AT chunfali evolutionarygameanalysisofpromotingindustrialinternetplatformstoempowermanufacturingsmesthroughvaluecocreationcooperation
AT rundegu evolutionarygameanalysisofpromotingindustrialinternetplatformstoempowermanufacturingsmesthroughvaluecocreationcooperation