The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China
Mariculture constitutes the primary origin of microplastic pollution, necessitating immediate action to address microplastic pollution by focusing on both the supply and demand aspects of fishing gear. Based on the cooperative management model of mariculture microplastic pollution, this paper develo...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2025-01-01
|
| Series: | Frontiers in Marine Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2024.1510364/full |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832594107780825088 |
|---|---|
| author | Haiming Song Xinting Wang Xiaomeng Huan Lin Yang |
| author_facet | Haiming Song Xinting Wang Xiaomeng Huan Lin Yang |
| author_sort | Haiming Song |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Mariculture constitutes the primary origin of microplastic pollution, necessitating immediate action to address microplastic pollution by focusing on both the supply and demand aspects of fishing gear. Based on the cooperative management model of mariculture microplastic pollution, this paper develops an evolutionary game model that incorporates the interactions among fishing gear enterprises, fishermen, and the government. It then proceeds to examine the government’s strategy for managing mariculture microplastic pollution through game theory and simulation analysis. The main findings obtained are as follows. (1) The management of mariculture microplastic pollution can be improved on both the supply chain and market aspects by implementing subsidies. The likelihood of receiving government subsidies boosts the production of environmentally-friendly fishing gear by fishing gear enterprises and the purchase of such gear by fishermen. (2) Based on the cost-benefit variations for fishing gear enterprises, fishermen, and the government, the evolutionary game model reaches distinct equilibrium states, leading to corresponding adjustments in the optimal government subsidy strategy. (3) While there are some positive effects of subsidies, increasing government subsidies does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. As the total amount of subsidies increases, the best practice for governments would be to phase out subsidies for environmentally-friendly fishing gear. Accordingly, the government should build a multi-subject collaborative governance model, reasonably control subsidies amount, prevent the adverse consequences of excessive subsidies, and optimize the structure of subsidy recipients. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ddd82f09c79746aba52325092b9bb2a8 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2296-7745 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Marine Science |
| spelling | doaj-art-ddd82f09c79746aba52325092b9bb2a82025-01-20T05:23:36ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Marine Science2296-77452025-01-011110.3389/fmars.2024.15103641510364The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, ChinaHaiming SongXinting WangXiaomeng HuanLin YangMariculture constitutes the primary origin of microplastic pollution, necessitating immediate action to address microplastic pollution by focusing on both the supply and demand aspects of fishing gear. Based on the cooperative management model of mariculture microplastic pollution, this paper develops an evolutionary game model that incorporates the interactions among fishing gear enterprises, fishermen, and the government. It then proceeds to examine the government’s strategy for managing mariculture microplastic pollution through game theory and simulation analysis. The main findings obtained are as follows. (1) The management of mariculture microplastic pollution can be improved on both the supply chain and market aspects by implementing subsidies. The likelihood of receiving government subsidies boosts the production of environmentally-friendly fishing gear by fishing gear enterprises and the purchase of such gear by fishermen. (2) Based on the cost-benefit variations for fishing gear enterprises, fishermen, and the government, the evolutionary game model reaches distinct equilibrium states, leading to corresponding adjustments in the optimal government subsidy strategy. (3) While there are some positive effects of subsidies, increasing government subsidies does not necessarily lead to better outcomes. As the total amount of subsidies increases, the best practice for governments would be to phase out subsidies for environmentally-friendly fishing gear. Accordingly, the government should build a multi-subject collaborative governance model, reasonably control subsidies amount, prevent the adverse consequences of excessive subsidies, and optimize the structure of subsidy recipients.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2024.1510364/fullmariculturemicroplasticsgovernment regulatory strategyevolutionary gamenumerical simulation |
| spellingShingle | Haiming Song Xinting Wang Xiaomeng Huan Lin Yang The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China Frontiers in Marine Science mariculture microplastics government regulatory strategy evolutionary game numerical simulation |
| title | The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China |
| title_full | The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China |
| title_fullStr | The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China |
| title_full_unstemmed | The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China |
| title_short | The impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture: an evolutionary game theory analysis in Qingdao, China |
| title_sort | impact of government subsidies on microplastic pollution control in mariculture an evolutionary game theory analysis in qingdao china |
| topic | mariculture microplastics government regulatory strategy evolutionary game numerical simulation |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2024.1510364/full |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT haimingsong theimpactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT xintingwang theimpactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT xiaomenghuan theimpactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT linyang theimpactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT haimingsong impactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT xintingwang impactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT xiaomenghuan impactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina AT linyang impactofgovernmentsubsidiesonmicroplasticpollutioncontrolinmaricultureanevolutionarygametheoryanalysisinqingdaochina |