Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Chile) and the Chilean Revolution (1965 – 1973)
The article analyzes the prerequisites for the emergence of the Chilean Left Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria – MIR) and its activities from the Constituent Congress in August 1965 to the coup of Septem-ber 11, 1973, the forms of MIR activities in the period of Popular...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Russian Academy of Science. Institute of World History
2025-03-01
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| Series: | Латиноамериканский исторический альманах |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ahl.igh.ru/uploads/article/file/338/савченко.pdf |
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| Summary: | The article analyzes the prerequisites for the emergence of the Chilean Left Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria – MIR) and its activities from the Constituent Congress in August 1965 to the coup of Septem-ber 11, 1973, the forms of MIR activities in the period of Popular Unity and the structure of the organization are con-sidered. The MIR emerged after the defeat of leftist candidate S. Allende in the 1964 elections as a result of the unification of groups that stood to the left of the leading parties of the Chilean labor movement - communists and socialists. MIR's main idea was to deny the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism. Striving to become a party of revolutionary war-fare, the MIRists during the Popular Unity government achieved their greatest success in mass legal work and man-aged to find social support among such popular groups as the slum dwellers and Mapuche peasants of southern Chile. De-fending the idea of “people's power” and “direct proletarian democracy”, the MIR after 1969 was organized hierarchically - vertically, party congresses were no longer held. As a result, contradictions within the organization accumulated and were not resolved. Activists who did not agree with the triumphal-ist sentiments of the party leadership withdrew or continued to engage in activities without enthusiasm. September 11 showed that the perceptions of friends and foes alike about the MIR's military abilities were exaggerated. The organization was just as unable to resist the military coup as the Popular Unity parties were unable to do so. |
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| ISSN: | 2305-8773 2713-0282 |