Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule

Evolutionary spatial game is a promising way to unravel the mystery of cooperation, and it has been well recognized that spatial structure could enable cooperation to persist. Schweitzer et al.’s lattice model provides an innovative method to solve the problem. In this paper, we conduct simulations...

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Main Authors: Yanbing Yang, Junhu Ruan, Bin Liu, Yi Liu, Yan Shi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2015-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/989024
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author Yanbing Yang
Junhu Ruan
Bin Liu
Yi Liu
Yan Shi
author_facet Yanbing Yang
Junhu Ruan
Bin Liu
Yi Liu
Yan Shi
author_sort Yanbing Yang
collection DOAJ
description Evolutionary spatial game is a promising way to unravel the mystery of cooperation, and it has been well recognized that spatial structure could enable cooperation to persist. Schweitzer et al.’s lattice model provides an innovative method to solve the problem. In this paper, we conduct simulations using the same von Neumann neighborhood as in Schweitzer et al.’s study (2002) and observe the effect of initial population and lattice size on the evolution of cooperation. Then, we extend the model with a more complicated Moore neighborhood and self-playing rule for each central player. Simulation results not only provide new evidence for the persistence of cooperation in the evolution with spatial structures, but also investigate critical conditions for the spatial coexistence or the invasion of cooperators and defectors with the more complicated neighborhood.
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series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
spelling doaj-art-d97399c9235244cb9c8b45655bf871f62025-02-03T01:11:48ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2015-01-01201510.1155/2015/989024989024Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing RuleYanbing Yang0Junhu Ruan1Bin Liu2Yi Liu3Yan Shi4Department of Mathematics, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116024, ChinaInstitute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, ChinaDepartment of Mathematics, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116024, ChinaDepartment of Mathematics, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116024, ChinaGeneral Education Center, Tokai University, 9-1-1 Toroku, Kumamoto 862-8652, JapanEvolutionary spatial game is a promising way to unravel the mystery of cooperation, and it has been well recognized that spatial structure could enable cooperation to persist. Schweitzer et al.’s lattice model provides an innovative method to solve the problem. In this paper, we conduct simulations using the same von Neumann neighborhood as in Schweitzer et al.’s study (2002) and observe the effect of initial population and lattice size on the evolution of cooperation. Then, we extend the model with a more complicated Moore neighborhood and self-playing rule for each central player. Simulation results not only provide new evidence for the persistence of cooperation in the evolution with spatial structures, but also investigate critical conditions for the spatial coexistence or the invasion of cooperators and defectors with the more complicated neighborhood.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/989024
spellingShingle Yanbing Yang
Junhu Ruan
Bin Liu
Yi Liu
Yan Shi
Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
title_full Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
title_fullStr Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
title_full_unstemmed Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
title_short Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule
title_sort evolution of cooperation with moore neighborhood and self playing rule
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/989024
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