An Inferentialist Account of Proper Names

DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii1.03 In this paper, I defend an inferentialist account of proper names. After a review of how the account works in the framework of Robert Brandom’s inferentialism, I focus on two objections. The first one, from a Russellian view, is that the inferentialist...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Rusong Huang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne / The Polish Semiotic Society 2024-12-01
Series:Studia Semiotyczne
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Online Access:http://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/article/view/258
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Summary:DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii1.03 In this paper, I defend an inferentialist account of proper names. After a review of how the account works in the framework of Robert Brandom’s inferentialism, I focus on two objections. The first one, from a Russellian view, is that the inferentialist account will eventually collapse into a Russellian description theory of proper names. The second, from a Millian view, is that the account fails due to the fact that proper names in fact have no conceptual content, as they are merely meaningless tags. I conclude by recapitulating the advantages of the inferentialist account of proper names.
ISSN:0137-6608
2544-073X