Les effets paradoxaux du transfert des forces de sécurité en Tunisie (juin 1955-mars 1956)
Tunisia was the first country in the French colonial empire to experience a phase of internal autonomy before independence. This began on 3 June 1955 and ended on 20 March 1956. The aim of this article is to analyse the process of transferring policing powers during this period. The transfer of poli...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fra |
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CNRS Éditions
2024-07-01
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| Series: | L’Année du Maghreb |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/anneemaghreb/13118 |
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| Summary: | Tunisia was the first country in the French colonial empire to experience a phase of internal autonomy before independence. This began on 3 June 1955 and ended on 20 March 1956. The aim of this article is to analyse the process of transferring policing powers during this period. The transfer of police powers was not a uniform process. In particular, it depended on the structure of the colonised state and the terms of decolonisation (the timing, duration, organisation and intensity of nationalist resistance movements). The first part examines the organisation of the Protectorate and the maintenance of the colonial order, as well as nationalist resistance, characterised by the presence of a hegemonic party, the Neo-Destour. Along with other members of the national movement, it was involved in an armed insurrection (1952-1954), and had important links with the nationalist fighters known as the fellaga. This analysis will provide a better understanding of the negotiations and the stakes involved in transferring the security apparatus, particularly after Pierre Mendès-France, the French Prime Minister, proposed opening negotiations for internal autonomy during his speech in Tunis on 31 July 1954. During these negotiations, France sought to keep large parts of the security apparatus under its control for as long as possible. Part Two explores this strategy. The French government imposed a gradual and slow transfer of police powers. At the same time, it is attempting to appropriate indefinitely the prerogatives of intelligence, territorial surveillance and control of border areas by redefining internal policing missions as defence missions, contrary to practice in mainland France.The terms of the internal autonomy agreements of June 1955 divided the Tunisian national movement, triggering a fratricidal war between the supporters of the Neo-Destour political bureau led by Habib Bourguiba and those of the party's secretary general, Salah Ben Youssef. The outcome of this competition depended not only on the number of supporters, but also on the ability to mobilise coercive resources and foreign support, particularly colonial and regional. Although they held the reins of the Tunisian government, the Bourguibists depended on French tutelage and police resources to repress their rivals while negotiating with France the conditions for Tunisia's emancipation.To explain this paradox, this article puts forward the hypothesis that the Yussefist opposition to the internal autonomy treaty contributed not only to the transfer of the law enforcement apparatus but also to the acceleration of independence. He examines how this transfer was not the sole responsibility of the colonial power. Nationalists seized upon this process, resisted it and exploited it to redefine their relationship with colonial domination and their place in the nationalist movement. By exploiting the Yussefist conflict, the Bourguibists and the Tunisian government succeeded in negotiating French support against their adversaries, the acceleration of the transfer of police powers and the creation of a paralegal armed force, controlled by the Neo-Destour party. They mobilised these militias to eliminate the Yusufist opposition, with the blessing and support of the French authorities. However, when the negotiations for independence ran into difficulties, Bourguiba warned that the Neo-Destour party, and not just the Yussefists, might resume the violence. He therefore used the police forces under the control of the Tunisian government and the Neo-Destour militias as a means of exerting pressure to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. |
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| ISSN: | 1952-8108 2109-9405 |