RPRep: A Robust and Privacy-Preserving Reputation Management Scheme for Pseudonym-Enabled VANETs

Establishing trust and reputation for evaluation of message reliability is key to the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Most of the previous reputation management systems focus on the effectiveness of the reputation management system in handling the liars who send false service messages. However,...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jin Wang, Yonghui Zhang, Youyuan Wang, Xiang Gu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2016-03-01
Series:International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/6138251
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Summary:Establishing trust and reputation for evaluation of message reliability is key to the vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). Most of the previous reputation management systems focus on the effectiveness of the reputation management system in handling the liars who send false service messages. However, these reputation management systems have two drawbacks. One is that they are vulnerable to tactical attacks such as self-promoting attacks and bad-mouthing attacks. The other is that they may violate location privacy because they assume every vehicle communicates with a unique ID. Our research particularly investigates the robustness against these tactical attacks, as well as the preservation of privacy by integrating trust management with the pseudonym technique. To resist the tactical attacks in VANETs, we present a reputation model which builds both service reputation and feedback reputation. Moreover, we apply the information entropy and the majority rule to the reputation accumulation algorithms to counter false feedback. To defend the reputation link attack during pseudonym changes, we propose hidden-zone strategy and k -anonymity strategy. The simulation results show that our scheme is robust to these tactical attacks and preserves privacy against the reputation link attack during the pseudonym changes.
ISSN:1550-1477