Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose?
This article revisits the technocratic model of legitimacy that the European Central Bank (ECB) has enjoyed since its early period, by exploring the Monetary Policy Strategy statements that constitute the “comprehensive framework” guiding the Bank’s operational decisions. We examine whether the oper...
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| Language: | English |
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Cogitatio
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Politics and Governance |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/9094 |
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| author | Dimitrios Argyroulis Nikolas Vagdoutis |
| author_facet | Dimitrios Argyroulis Nikolas Vagdoutis |
| author_sort | Dimitrios Argyroulis |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This article revisits the technocratic model of legitimacy that the European Central Bank (ECB) has enjoyed since its early period, by exploring the Monetary Policy Strategy statements that constitute the “comprehensive framework” guiding the Bank’s operational decisions. We examine whether the operational framework and the interpretation of the ECB’s legal mandate, which are included in these statements, are aligned with this model. We find that the ECB’s early monetary policy statements (1998 and 2003) appear to be aligned with this model, due to the presence of strictly defined performance criteria and an interpretation of the ECB’s mandate that was limited to pursuing price stability as a single objective. Our analysis of the ECB’s 2021 monetary policy strategy highlights its incompatibility with the technocratic model as a result of significant changes that enabled wide policy discretion and a re-interpretation of the ECB’s mandate, which revealed a largely vague and broad mandate. We argue that the ECB’s model of technocratic legitimacy is untenable in a democratic polity, given the extent and type of choices that the Governing Council is required to make in the current policy setting. Finally, we suggest that only a strengthening of the (hitherto diminished) input dimension of the ECB’s legitimacy could address this legitimacy gap. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-d2e4233c9f1442b588843036250e078e |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2183-2463 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Cogitatio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Politics and Governance |
| spelling | doaj-art-d2e4233c9f1442b588843036250e078e2025-01-30T10:39:25ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632025-01-0113010.17645/pag.90943931Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose?Dimitrios Argyroulis0Nikolas Vagdoutis1Department of Social Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg / Centre d’Étude de la Vie Politique (Cevipol), Université Libre de Bruxelles, BelgiumDepartment of Law, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg / Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh, UKThis article revisits the technocratic model of legitimacy that the European Central Bank (ECB) has enjoyed since its early period, by exploring the Monetary Policy Strategy statements that constitute the “comprehensive framework” guiding the Bank’s operational decisions. We examine whether the operational framework and the interpretation of the ECB’s legal mandate, which are included in these statements, are aligned with this model. We find that the ECB’s early monetary policy statements (1998 and 2003) appear to be aligned with this model, due to the presence of strictly defined performance criteria and an interpretation of the ECB’s mandate that was limited to pursuing price stability as a single objective. Our analysis of the ECB’s 2021 monetary policy strategy highlights its incompatibility with the technocratic model as a result of significant changes that enabled wide policy discretion and a re-interpretation of the ECB’s mandate, which revealed a largely vague and broad mandate. We argue that the ECB’s model of technocratic legitimacy is untenable in a democratic polity, given the extent and type of choices that the Governing Council is required to make in the current policy setting. Finally, we suggest that only a strengthening of the (hitherto diminished) input dimension of the ECB’s legitimacy could address this legitimacy gap.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/9094european central banklegal mandatelegitimacymonetary policy strategyunconventional monetary policies |
| spellingShingle | Dimitrios Argyroulis Nikolas Vagdoutis Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? Politics and Governance european central bank legal mandate legitimacy monetary policy strategy unconventional monetary policies |
| title | Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? |
| title_full | Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? |
| title_fullStr | Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? |
| title_short | Revisiting ECB’s Technocratic Legitimacy: No Longer Fit‐for‐Purpose? |
| title_sort | revisiting ecb s technocratic legitimacy no longer fit for purpose |
| topic | european central bank legal mandate legitimacy monetary policy strategy unconventional monetary policies |
| url | https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/9094 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dimitriosargyroulis revisitingecbstechnocraticlegitimacynolongerfitforpurpose AT nikolasvagdoutis revisitingecbstechnocraticlegitimacynolongerfitforpurpose |