Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game

With the large-scale access of user-side energy storage devices, shared energy storage has emerged as a key mode of energy storage in distribution networks. This mode requires efficient management of energy storage devices that balances the interests of different entities such as power supply enterp...

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Main Authors: Jindong Cui, Zengchen Zhu, Guoli Qu, Yuqing Wang, Ruotong Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2025-03-01
Series:International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061524006100
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author Jindong Cui
Zengchen Zhu
Guoli Qu
Yuqing Wang
Ruotong Li
author_facet Jindong Cui
Zengchen Zhu
Guoli Qu
Yuqing Wang
Ruotong Li
author_sort Jindong Cui
collection DOAJ
description With the large-scale access of user-side energy storage devices, shared energy storage has emerged as a key mode of energy storage in distribution networks. This mode requires efficient management of energy storage devices that balances the interests of different entities such as power supply enterprises, shared energy storage operators, and prosumers. In this mode, the formulation of charging and discharging prices is crucial. This paper proposed a dual-layer pricing model for shared energy storage systems based on mixed-game theory and its solution method. First, this study developed an upper-level stackelberg game model between the power supply enterprise and the cooperative alliance. The power supply enterprise, acting as the leader, sought to minimize operational costs while negotiating transaction electricity prices with the cooperative alliance. Second, a cooperative game model was developed within the lower-level alliance. As followers, the cooperative alliance seeks to maximize the alliance’s overall benefits. Based on the upper-level transaction electricity price and Nash bargaining theory, the internal transaction electricity price within the alliance was determined through negotiation. Subsequently, charging and discharging strategies were formulated along with a profit distribution mechanism. Finally, case studies simulations were used to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed model.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 0142-0615
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publisher Elsevier
record_format Article
series International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems
spelling doaj-art-d0410eee25674ee1a0f8058d245290ee2025-01-19T06:23:52ZengElsevierInternational Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems0142-06152025-03-01164110387Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash gameJindong Cui0Zengchen Zhu1Guoli Qu2Yuqing Wang3Ruotong Li4School of Economics and Management, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, Jilin 132012, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, Jilin 132012, ChinaCorresponding author.; School of Economics and Management, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, Jilin 132012, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, Jilin 132012, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin, Jilin 132012, ChinaWith the large-scale access of user-side energy storage devices, shared energy storage has emerged as a key mode of energy storage in distribution networks. This mode requires efficient management of energy storage devices that balances the interests of different entities such as power supply enterprises, shared energy storage operators, and prosumers. In this mode, the formulation of charging and discharging prices is crucial. This paper proposed a dual-layer pricing model for shared energy storage systems based on mixed-game theory and its solution method. First, this study developed an upper-level stackelberg game model between the power supply enterprise and the cooperative alliance. The power supply enterprise, acting as the leader, sought to minimize operational costs while negotiating transaction electricity prices with the cooperative alliance. Second, a cooperative game model was developed within the lower-level alliance. As followers, the cooperative alliance seeks to maximize the alliance’s overall benefits. Based on the upper-level transaction electricity price and Nash bargaining theory, the internal transaction electricity price within the alliance was determined through negotiation. Subsequently, charging and discharging strategies were formulated along with a profit distribution mechanism. Finally, case studies simulations were used to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed model.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061524006100Mixed game theoryPower supply enterpriseShared energy storage operatorProsumersPricing strategy
spellingShingle Jindong Cui
Zengchen Zhu
Guoli Qu
Yuqing Wang
Ruotong Li
Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems
Mixed game theory
Power supply enterprise
Shared energy storage operator
Prosumers
Pricing strategy
title Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
title_full Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
title_fullStr Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
title_full_unstemmed Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
title_short Demand-side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg-Nash game
title_sort demand side shared energy storage pricing strategy based on stackelberg nash game
topic Mixed game theory
Power supply enterprise
Shared energy storage operator
Prosumers
Pricing strategy
url http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142061524006100
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AT zengchenzhu demandsidesharedenergystoragepricingstrategybasedonstackelbergnashgame
AT guoliqu demandsidesharedenergystoragepricingstrategybasedonstackelbergnashgame
AT yuqingwang demandsidesharedenergystoragepricingstrategybasedonstackelbergnashgame
AT ruotongli demandsidesharedenergystoragepricingstrategybasedonstackelbergnashgame