Green Supply Chain Decisions and Revenue-Sharing Contracts under Manufacturers’ Overconfidence
Overconfidence is a prevalent and potentially catastrophic behaviour in judgment and decision-making. In this paper, we define manufacturers’ overconfidence as a belief bias that they overestimate the impact of product greenness on demand and the accuracy of demand uncertainty. We build a game theor...
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Main Authors: | Hui Zhou, Lu Liu, Weifan Jiang, Shengsheng Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2022-01-01
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Series: | Journal of Mathematics |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/1035966 |
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