Countering detector manipulation attacks in quantum communication through detector self-testing

In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns and has been add...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Lijiong Shen, Christian Kurtsiefer
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: AIP Publishing LLC 2025-01-01
Series:APL Photonics
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/5.0233772
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Summary:In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding attacks has been one of the biggest concerns and has been addressed both by technical means as well as advanced protocols. In this work, we present a countermeasure against such attacks based on self-testing of detectors to confirm their intended operation without relying on specific aspects of their inner working and to reveal any manipulation attempts. We experimentally demonstrate this countermeasure with a typical InGaAs avalanche photodetector, but the scheme can be easily implemented with any single photon detector.
ISSN:2378-0967