Well-being is dead, long live well-being!
My primary concern in this paper is with how answering a central metaethical question about well-being impacts work on substantive theories of well-being. Specifically, I argue that well-being invariantism is a priori untenable and hence that any attempt to establish one or more substantive prudent...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas, Centro de Estudos de Filosofia
2025-01-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Philosophy and Social Values |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.ucp.pt/index.php/philosophyandsocialvalues/article/view/13856 |
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