S. Cowling. Kantian Humility and Ontological Categories / trans. from Engl. A. V. Nekhaev
Kant has a distinction between things in themselves and phenomena. Things as we know them consist ‘wholly of relations’ therefore we have no insight into ‘the inner’ of things. Kant says that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things. There are irremediable constraints on what we...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Omsk State Technical University, Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education
2024-02-01
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| Series: | Омский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность" |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.omgtu.ru/general_information/media_omgtu/journal_of_omsk_research_journal/files/arhiv/2024/%D0%A2.9,%20%E2%84%961%20(%D0%9E%D0%98%D0%A1)/91-96%20%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B3%20%D0%A1..pdf |
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| Summary: | Kant has a distinction between things in themselves and phenomena. Things as
we know them consist ‘wholly of relations’ therefore we have no insight into ‘the
inner’ of things. Kant says that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of
things. There are irremediable constraints on what we can know, inevitable limits on
what we can become acquainted with. This is a kind of Epistemic Humility. It entails
Categorical Humility, according to which we are just as irremediably ignorant of
the categorical properties of entities. Ignorance of the categorical structure of the
world creates two problems for defenders of Kantian Humility. First, if we know
that Kantian Humility to be true, it must be false. Second, if Kantian Humility is true,
the argument for it cannot succeed. |
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| ISSN: | 2542-0488 2541-7983 |