Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies

The transmission process of information among computers of network is considered as the procedure of interactive behaviors. In this article, we present a mean field game model for the binary interactive behaviors between the malicious attackers and the defenders. We first discuss the evolution of th...

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Main Authors: Li Miao, Shuai Li
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2017-10-01
Series:International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/1550147717737908
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author Li Miao
Shuai Li
author_facet Li Miao
Shuai Li
author_sort Li Miao
collection DOAJ
description The transmission process of information among computers of network is considered as the procedure of interactive behaviors. In this article, we present a mean field game model for the binary interactive behaviors between the malicious attackers and the defenders. We first discuss the evolution of the states of the malicious attackers and the defenders using the susceptiable-infective-Removal epidemic model in which we take into account the stochastic process of the propagation of the infected computers and the attack intensity. Then, we formulate the mean field game consistency stability problem generated by a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation of the individual player and the fixed-point problem. Finally, we derive the optimal individual strategy with an appropriate assumption that the response time of the defense system is faster than the infection rate.
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series International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
spelling doaj-art-cb6c14fcc56d4abd8142d084fea0b8f42025-08-20T03:23:34ZengWileyInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks1550-14772017-10-011310.1177/1550147717737908Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategiesLi MiaoShuai LiThe transmission process of information among computers of network is considered as the procedure of interactive behaviors. In this article, we present a mean field game model for the binary interactive behaviors between the malicious attackers and the defenders. We first discuss the evolution of the states of the malicious attackers and the defenders using the susceptiable-infective-Removal epidemic model in which we take into account the stochastic process of the propagation of the infected computers and the attack intensity. Then, we formulate the mean field game consistency stability problem generated by a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation of the individual player and the fixed-point problem. Finally, we derive the optimal individual strategy with an appropriate assumption that the response time of the defense system is faster than the infection rate.https://doi.org/10.1177/1550147717737908
spellingShingle Li Miao
Shuai Li
Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
title Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
title_full Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
title_fullStr Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
title_full_unstemmed Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
title_short Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
title_sort cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender attacker strategies
url https://doi.org/10.1177/1550147717737908
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AT shuaili cybersecuritybasedonmeanfieldgamemodelofthedefenderattackerstrategies