Evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games with continuous opinions based on the HK model
Abstract In real life, individuals hold diverse opinions on various issues, which influence their behavior and gradually shape their behavioral norms over time, thereby impacting group behavior. To explore how group behavior evolves under the influence of individual opinions, we introduce continuous...
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| Main Authors: | Ji Quan, Leyao Tao, Tianyu Ren |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer
2025-05-01
|
| Series: | Management System Engineering |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s44176-025-00041-6 |
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