The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach
The prevalence of opportunistic behaviors in agri-food production and circulation results in frequent quality accidents in emerging economies. Numerous researches have discussed effective countermeasures to this problem, but few of them focus on the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance s...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2018-01-01
|
| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5185497 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832552046513881088 |
|---|---|
| author | Xin Su Haolong Liu Shunqi Hou |
| author_facet | Xin Su Haolong Liu Shunqi Hou |
| author_sort | Xin Su |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The prevalence of opportunistic behaviors in agri-food production and circulation results in frequent quality accidents in emerging economies. Numerous researches have discussed effective countermeasures to this problem, but few of them focus on the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems. Owing to the bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the dynamic quality game among producers, marketers, and consumers has significant characteristics of complexity. This paper aims at discussing the farmer-supermarket direct purchase’s contributions to ensure the agri-food quality and analyzing the effectiveness, stability, and key factors of this new industrial organization. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we establish the trilateral-game payoff matrix, build up the replicator dynamic equations, and discuss possible evolutionary stable states. The simulation results show that the evolutionary system converges to desired stability faster, when the high-quality agri-food’s market premium increases and the penalty for violating quality standards increases. Furthermore, when farmers share more high-quality agri-food’s market premiums and marketers compensate more for violating the quality standards than before, the evolutionary system also converges to desired stability faster. Therefore, the quality information tracing technology, farmers and marketers’ fair distribution of profits and risks, and consumers’ capabilities to safeguard their legal rights are the three key factors to maintain the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-c8fa7fabc1a64d60897a0084f1f37811 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2018-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-c8fa7fabc1a64d60897a0084f1f378112025-02-03T05:59:42ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262018-01-01201810.1155/2018/51854975185497The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation ApproachXin Su0Haolong Liu1Shunqi Hou2School of MBA, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, ChinaSchool of Business Administration, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014, ChinaCollege of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaThe prevalence of opportunistic behaviors in agri-food production and circulation results in frequent quality accidents in emerging economies. Numerous researches have discussed effective countermeasures to this problem, but few of them focus on the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems. Owing to the bounded rationality and information asymmetry, the dynamic quality game among producers, marketers, and consumers has significant characteristics of complexity. This paper aims at discussing the farmer-supermarket direct purchase’s contributions to ensure the agri-food quality and analyzing the effectiveness, stability, and key factors of this new industrial organization. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we establish the trilateral-game payoff matrix, build up the replicator dynamic equations, and discuss possible evolutionary stable states. The simulation results show that the evolutionary system converges to desired stability faster, when the high-quality agri-food’s market premium increases and the penalty for violating quality standards increases. Furthermore, when farmers share more high-quality agri-food’s market premiums and marketers compensate more for violating the quality standards than before, the evolutionary system also converges to desired stability faster. Therefore, the quality information tracing technology, farmers and marketers’ fair distribution of profits and risks, and consumers’ capabilities to safeguard their legal rights are the three key factors to maintain the effectiveness and stability of quality assurance systems.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5185497 |
| spellingShingle | Xin Su Haolong Liu Shunqi Hou The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach Complexity |
| title | The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach |
| title_full | The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach |
| title_fullStr | The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach |
| title_short | The Trilateral Evolutionary Game of Agri-Food Quality in Farmer-Supermarket Direct Purchase: A Simulation Approach |
| title_sort | trilateral evolutionary game of agri food quality in farmer supermarket direct purchase a simulation approach |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5185497 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT xinsu thetrilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach AT haolongliu thetrilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach AT shunqihou thetrilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach AT xinsu trilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach AT haolongliu trilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach AT shunqihou trilateralevolutionarygameofagrifoodqualityinfarmersupermarketdirectpurchaseasimulationapproach |