Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory
In the process of global digital trade rules negotiation, game and cooperation coexist, and all parties are actively seeking cooperative relationship while negotiating game. Against this background, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the negotiation process of global digital trade rules...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mathematics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5911347 |
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| author | Bei Zhang |
| author_facet | Bei Zhang |
| author_sort | Bei Zhang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the process of global digital trade rules negotiation, game and cooperation coexist, and all parties are actively seeking cooperative relationship while negotiating game. Against this background, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the negotiation process of global digital trade rules and analyzes the core issues of the negotiations and their implied political game. This paper firstly compares the core issues of global digital trade rules negotiations at multilateral and regional levels and quantitatively reflects the weighting relationship between core issues and keywords by means of a dynamic thematic model. In order to judge the potential partnership of each country, this paper constructs a theoretical model of partner selection for global digital trade rules negotiation from the perspective of political game and uses the data of 62 major digital trade countries for empirical testing. Compared with traditional trade agreements, the consensus reached in digital trade negotiations is less influenced by traditional economic geography factors and more influenced by the level of digital trade restrictions and political distance. When signing digital trade terms, a country tends to choose countries with similar levels of digital trade restrictions and high political similarity as partners. Financial restrictions and trade restrictions are the most important digital trade restriction factors that countries pay attention to when negotiating, and political stability is the most important political factor that countries pay attention to when negotiating. Compared with developed countries, developing countries pay more attention to market size, cultural differences, and digital infrastructure when negotiating. The formulation of global digital trade rules may follow a reconstructive path from bilateral to regional to multilateral, promoting regional digital trade rule systems at this stage and gradually expanding the scope of negotiations to the multilateral level. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-c560298f4b584ed5b75c02808ae5c702 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2314-4785 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj-art-c560298f4b584ed5b75c02808ae5c7022025-02-03T07:24:14ZengWileyJournal of Mathematics2314-47852021-01-01202110.1155/2021/5911347Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game TheoryBei Zhang0School of Business AdministrationIn the process of global digital trade rules negotiation, game and cooperation coexist, and all parties are actively seeking cooperative relationship while negotiating game. Against this background, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the negotiation process of global digital trade rules and analyzes the core issues of the negotiations and their implied political game. This paper firstly compares the core issues of global digital trade rules negotiations at multilateral and regional levels and quantitatively reflects the weighting relationship between core issues and keywords by means of a dynamic thematic model. In order to judge the potential partnership of each country, this paper constructs a theoretical model of partner selection for global digital trade rules negotiation from the perspective of political game and uses the data of 62 major digital trade countries for empirical testing. Compared with traditional trade agreements, the consensus reached in digital trade negotiations is less influenced by traditional economic geography factors and more influenced by the level of digital trade restrictions and political distance. When signing digital trade terms, a country tends to choose countries with similar levels of digital trade restrictions and high political similarity as partners. Financial restrictions and trade restrictions are the most important digital trade restriction factors that countries pay attention to when negotiating, and political stability is the most important political factor that countries pay attention to when negotiating. Compared with developed countries, developing countries pay more attention to market size, cultural differences, and digital infrastructure when negotiating. The formulation of global digital trade rules may follow a reconstructive path from bilateral to regional to multilateral, promoting regional digital trade rule systems at this stage and gradually expanding the scope of negotiations to the multilateral level.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5911347 |
| spellingShingle | Bei Zhang Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory Journal of Mathematics |
| title | Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory |
| title_full | Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory |
| title_fullStr | Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory |
| title_full_unstemmed | Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory |
| title_short | Behavioral Analysis in International Business Negotiations Based on the Bargaining Model of Game Theory |
| title_sort | behavioral analysis in international business negotiations based on the bargaining model of game theory |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5911347 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT beizhang behavioralanalysisininternationalbusinessnegotiationsbasedonthebargainingmodelofgametheory |