Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
This paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determ...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2012-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/416789 |
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| _version_ | 1832566851990716416 |
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| author | Orlando Gomes |
| author_facet | Orlando Gomes |
| author_sort | Orlando Gomes |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-bb59316c54324c4dbae9b43b909b7b73 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2012-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-bb59316c54324c4dbae9b43b909b7b732025-02-03T01:03:02ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2012-01-01201210.1155/2012/416789416789Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary GamesOrlando Gomes0Business Research Unit (UNIDE), Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) and Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração de Lisboa (ISCAL/IPL), 1069-035 Lisbon, PortugalThis paper furnishes a guide for the study of 2-dimensional evolutionary games in discrete time. Evolutionarily stable strategies are identified and nonlinear outcomes are explored. Besides the baseline payoffs of the established strategic interaction, the following elements are also vital to determine the dynamic outcome of a game: the initial fitness of each agent and the rule of motion that describes how individuals switch between strategies. In addition to the dynamic rule commonly used in evolutionary games, the replicator dynamics, we propose another rule, which acknowledges the role of expectations and sophisticates the replicator mechanism.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/416789 |
| spellingShingle | Orlando Gomes Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games |
| title_full | Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games |
| title_fullStr | Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games |
| title_short | Discrete Dynamics in Evolutionary Games |
| title_sort | discrete dynamics in evolutionary games |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/416789 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT orlandogomes discretedynamicsinevolutionarygames |