Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief
In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: the vivacity connected to belief is different in kind from that from t...
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Aperio
2024-06-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/1910/ |
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| author | Michael Jacovides |
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| description | In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: the vivacity connected to belief is different in kind from that from the vivacity connected to poetry. Poetry can be more vivid, in its way, than belief. Since Hume’s main arguments for the thesis that beliefs are vivid ideas in the main body of the Treatise depend on the assumption that ideas with the same object only vary in vivacity, he owes us new arguments from his claim. He provides various arguments for a slightly revised thesis that belief is a sort of vivid idea at the beginning of the appendix. Three of these arguments, an argument from introspection, an argument from the involuntariness of belief, and an appeal to the explanatory power of his account are preserved in the first Enquiry. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ba3562297dbf400ea3b5eb98b3336e65 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2644-0652 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-06-01 |
| publisher | Aperio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-ba3562297dbf400ea3b5eb98b3336e652025-01-31T16:09:04ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522024-06-016010.25894/jmp.1910Hume's Second Thoughts About BeliefMichael Jacovides0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5440-9782Purdue UniversityIn the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: the vivacity connected to belief is different in kind from that from the vivacity connected to poetry. Poetry can be more vivid, in its way, than belief. Since Hume’s main arguments for the thesis that beliefs are vivid ideas in the main body of the Treatise depend on the assumption that ideas with the same object only vary in vivacity, he owes us new arguments from his claim. He provides various arguments for a slightly revised thesis that belief is a sort of vivid idea at the beginning of the appendix. Three of these arguments, an argument from introspection, an argument from the involuntariness of belief, and an appeal to the explanatory power of his account are preserved in the first Enquiry.https://jmphil.org/article/id/1910/HumeBeliefVivacityPoetic Feeling |
| spellingShingle | Michael Jacovides Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief Journal of Modern Philosophy Hume Belief Vivacity Poetic Feeling |
| title | Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief |
| title_full | Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief |
| title_fullStr | Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief |
| title_full_unstemmed | Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief |
| title_short | Hume's Second Thoughts About Belief |
| title_sort | hume s second thoughts about belief |
| topic | Hume Belief Vivacity Poetic Feeling |
| url | https://jmphil.org/article/id/1910/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT michaeljacovides humessecondthoughtsaboutbelief |